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Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors:
Defining a Role for Statutory Rape
MICHELLE OBERMANt
INTRODUCTION
A 1995 study revealed that, by the age of sixteen, 50%
of U.S. teenagers have had sexual intercourse.' This result,
which echoes the findings of many similar studies, reveals a
serious problem for criminal justice. The age of consent to
sexual contact under the vast majority of state statutes is
sixteen or older, and thus, each incident of sexual inter-
course among this population is illicit-each constitutes a
separate instance of statutory rape.' The numbers are stag-
gering. Utilizing U.S. Census Bureau figures, the 50% fig-
t Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to many
wonderful people who have taught me about the real world as it pertains to
girls, statutory rape and the law: The Ad Hoc Illinois Task Force on Statutory
Rape (and particularly Polly Poskin and Lyn Schollett, of the Illinois Coalition
Against Sexual Assault), participants at the "3R conference" in Visalia, Califor-
nia, May, 2000 (and particularly Bill Yoshimoto), participants at the Urban
Girls Conference, in Buffalo, N.Y., April, 2000, and participants and Krista
Sorvino, the organizer of the DePaul Law Review's 10th Annual Symposium, on
Statutory Rape Realities, March, 2000. Several readers lent generous comments
and support to an early draft: Katharine Baker, Mary Becker, Lynne
Henderson, Polly Poskin, Jane Rutherford and Lyn Schollett. And my research
assistants, Sarah Alipourian, Ardyth Eisenberg, Erin Kinahan, and Mark
Partin have worked so hard and so willingly that I pray to be given the oppor-
tunity to reciprocate-so long as it doesn't involve any Bluebooking! Thanks
also to Dean Teree Foster and DePaul for generous support. This article is for
my little girls, Hanna and Noa, who need a bigger, better, and safer world in
which to grow up.
1. Charles W. Warren et al., Sexual Behavior Among U.S. High School Stu-
dents, 1990-1995, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 170, 171 (1998).
2. See Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In
Search of Reason, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 62 (1997). Statutory rape is a
strict liability crime imposed on those who engage in sexual activity with cer-
tain groups of minors. This article will refer to the crime as "statutory rape,"
rather than the broader "criminal sexual misconduct," under which many states
presently include the offense formerly known as statutory rape.
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ure implies that there are at least 7.5 million incidents of
statutory rape per year.8
For any number of reasons, it would be unimaginable to
attempt to prosecute every instance of sexual contact with
minors. In addition to the sheer magnitude of such an un-
dertaking, and the futility of attempting to prosecute teen-
agers for an activity that almost half of them are engaging
in, to a certain extent adolescent sexual behavior is usual
and expected, and perhaps even part of healthy growth and
development. It is difficult to view this conduct as criminal
when society permits teenagers to obtain their own repro-
ductive health care, including contraception and treatment
for sexually transmitted diseases, free from parental notifi-
cation or consent. Moreover, although rates of sexual inter-
course clearly are higher today than they were forty years
ago, there is little reason to believe that the high rates of
adolescent sexual activity reflect a new trend.4 In fact,
teenage pregnancy rates were higher in the 1970s and
1980s than they are today.5 Thus, it seems that for many
years, a large number of adolescents have engaged in illicit
sexual conduct, and that the criminal justice system has
looked the other way.
But the fact that a behavior is typical does not neces-
sarily dictate that it should be completely unregulated. Af-
ter all, there are many examples of laws that penalize con-
duct that is commonplace, such as speeding or smoking
marijuana. Furthermore, there are considerable risks in-
herent in adolescent sexual conduct, and a myriad of ways
in which minors, because of their inexperience, are vulner-
able to exploitation and coercion in their sexual interac-
tions. Scholars from various fields have documented these
risks, and explored the harms suffered by victims of coer-
3. This estimate is admittedly low, taking into account only the fifteen mil-
lion U.S. residents who are between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, and as-
suming that 50% of them have had intercourse once. Obviously, many young
people have intercourse earlier than age thirteen, and many more have inter-
course more than once. It is also worth noting that the definition of statutory
rape varies across jurisdictions. Thus, sexual intercourse between two minors is
a crime in some, but not all, jurisdictions. See infra notes 205-08 and accompa-
nying text.
4. See Tom Kean & Isabel Sawhill, Editorial, More Teens Just Say 'No',
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2000, at A25; Erin McClam, Teen Births Drop to Lowest
Level in 60 Years, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Aug. 9, 2000, at A3.
5. See McClam, supra note 4, at A3; Kristen Luker, Dubious Conceptions:
The Controversy Over Teen Pregnancy, in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 73 (1991).
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cive or abusive sexual conduct.6 Perhaps the most obvious,
though by no means the most grave, of these risks is unin-
tended pregnancy. It is this factor that has prompted fed-
eral and state governments, beginning in the mid-1990s, to
encourage the vigorous enforcement of statutory rape laws.'
In 1990, Professor Michael Males published a small
study that indicated that a startlingly high number of ba-
bies born to young teen mothers were fathered by adult
men.8 When the Alan Guttmacher Institute replicated this
study across a larger population base, the results were even
more powerful: 29.2% of babies born to girls under age six-
teen were fathered by men over age twenty-one, and the
younger the girls, the older the average age of the father.'
6. See generally ELIZABETH DEBOLD ET AL., MOTHER DAUGHTER REVOLUTION
180-81 (1993); NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE
USED AGAINST WOMEN (1991); Antonietta Caffaro-Rouget et al., The Impact of
Child Sexual Abuse on Victims' Adjustment, 2 ANNALS OF SEX RESEARCH 29, 29-
47 (1989); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sex-
ual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988); David M. Fergusson et al., Child-
hood Sexual Abuse, Adolescent Sexual Behaviors and Sexual Revictimization, 21
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 789, 789-803 (1997); Michelle Fine, Sexuality, School-
ing, and Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of Desire, 58 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 29 (1988); Carol R. Hartman & Ann Wolbert Burgess, Sexual Abuse of
Children: Causes and Consequences, in CHILD MALTREATMENT: THEORY AND
RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 95-
128 (Dante Cicchetti & Vicki Carlson eds., 1989); Barbara Krahe et al., Child-
hood Sexual Abuse and Revictimization in Adolescence, 23 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 383, 383-94 (1994); Annette Lawson, Multiple Fractures: The Cultural
Construction of Teenage Sexuality and Pregnancy, in THE POLITICS OF
PREGNANCY 101 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993); Alice Mayall
& Steven R. Gold, Definitional Issues and Mediating Variables in the Sexual
Revictimization of Women Sexually Abused as Children, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 26, 26-29 (1995); R.L. Palmer et al., Childhood Sexual Experiences
with Adults Reported by Female Psychiatric Patients, 160 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY
261, 261-65 (1992); Catherine Stevens-Simon & Susan Reichert, Sexual Abuse,
Adolescent Pregnancy, and Child Abuse: A Developmental Approach to an
Intergenerational Cycle, 148 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT IED. 23
(1994); Deborah L. Tolman, Doing Desire: Adolescent Girls' Struggles for/with
Sexuality 8 GENDER & SOCIETY 326 (1994).
7. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
8. See Mike Males, Adult Liaison in the "Epidemic" of "Teenage" Birth,
Pregnancy, and Venereal Disease, 29 J. SEX RES. 525, 527-44 (1992).
9. See Jacqueline E. Darroch et al., Age Differences Between Sexual Partners
in the United States, 31 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 160, 163 (1999); see also Rigel Oliv-
eri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52
STAN. L. REV. 463, 504-05 (2000) (asserting that the vague term "teen" has lead
to subsequent qualifications of these findings and that recent nationwide stud-
ies have found that nearly two-thirds of all teen mothers are eighteen to nine-
teen years old and, thus, are adults).
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Those who were familiar with the problems stemming
from teen pregnancy immediately understood the far-
reaching implications of this information. Girls who have
their first children as teens are less likely to complete high
school, less likely to marry, less likely to be able to support
their families, and more likely to require public assistance
at various points in their lives than are girls who postpone
childbearing until after their teenage years.0 Thus, at the
aggregate level, the men who fathered these children may
be seen as costing states untold millions of dollars.
It was against this backdrop that interest in statutory
rape was rekindled. After all, this research indicated that
many babies born to underage girls were, in essence,
"criminal evidence." Their very conception was the result of
a criminal act. At its core, the revival of interest in statu-
tory rape that began in the late twentieth century reflects a
concern with teen pregnancy and the harm it causes to the
social fabric and, in particular, to the public coffers.'2
The recent governmental push to reinvigorate the en-
forcement of statutory rape laws forces the question of the
extent to which the criminal law can and should regulate
adolescent sexual behavior. Contemporary society's rela-
tively promiscuous climate makes it extremely difficult to
articulate the appropriate role for the criminal justice sys-
tem in approaching adolescent sexual interactions. It is
unimaginable that statutory rape laws could be fully en-
forced. And yet, if they are to be enforced selectively, which
cases most merit punishment? In part, the challenge de-
rives from the lack of a guiding principle for distinguishing
between problematic adolescent sexual behavior and nor-
mal adolescent sexual exploration.
Given these circumstances, selective enforcement of
statutory rape laws is inevitable. At present, however, the
laws are being selectively enforced in the absence of any co-
herent rationale. This article will explore and attempt to
10. Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape Laws Be Effective In Preventing
Adolescent Pregnancy?, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERS. 30, 34 (1997).
11. It remains to be seen how this set of assumptions may be affected by
current "welfare reform" provisions providing lifetime limits on government as-
sistance and mandating that recipients find employment. See Nancy E.
Hoffinan, Workfare Implications for the Public Sector, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 769,
771-74 (1999).
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the shifting ra-
tionales for enforcing statutory rape laws).
[Vol. 48706
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repair the fault lines in the construction and implementa-
tion of contemporary statutory rape laws. Part I provides an
overview of some of the problems occasioned by adolescent
sexual activity, making the case for legal oversight and in-
tervention. Part II describes and critiques contemporary
statutory rape enforcement patterns. Specifically, I identify
three case-selection "strategies" currently employed by
criminal justice authorities, and explain how, in some cases,
they operate to the victim's detriment. Part III explores
various reforms to the common law construction of statu-
tory rape-reforms that have been adopted into law by
various jurisdictions, as well as those that have been sug-
gested by other commentators. Finally, I conclude the arti-
cle by proposing a reformulation of statutory rape law that
more closely approximates the goal of protecting a vulner-
able population from sexual exploitation and coercion.
I. CONTEMPORARY ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY: NONVOLUNTARY
INTERCOURSE AND THE CASE FOR LEGAL OVERSIGHT
One problem with statutory rape laws in a society in
which adolescent sexuality is pervasive is that they sound
almost prudish. By definition, statutory rape penalizes sex-
ual encounters that do not constitute forcible rape, and that
one might therefore presume to be wholly consensual. Most
statutory rape laws are drafted with sufficient breadth to
encompass all sexual contact with minors under a given
age, and therefore penalize even the most innocent and mu-
tually desired expressions of adolescent sexuality. If one op-
erates under the assumption that all sexual encounters can
be neatly divided into two categories-rape and sex-and
one considers sex to be presumptively good, then statutory
rape laws certainly seem retrograde, intrusive, and unduly
paternalistic."3
This dichotomous view of sex has been completely re-
pudiated by a host of significant authorities.'4 Instead, it
13. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflection on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1300 (1991). But cf Lynne Henderson, Just What Part of
No Don't You Understand?, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 57 (1993) (presenting a
description of a continuum between rape and sex).
14. See Henderson, supra note 13, at 57. See generally Robin L. West, The
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 266-68 (2000) (describing how a
woman "consent[s]" to unwanted sex and therefore becomes a "giving self' in
2000] 707
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seems far more likely that sexual encounters range across
various points on a spectrum between mutually desired,
pleasurable, fully consensual sex, and forcible rape." We
know that, for adults, some sexual encounters may be beau-
tiful and mutually desired. But it is evident that many
adult sexual encounters fall short of this ideal. For teens,
we know far less. There is a remarkable paucity of research
describing what might be termed "consensual" sexual rela-
tionships among adolescents. Aside from several chronicles
describing the loss of virginity among teens, we know little
about the substance of adolescent sexual relationships.
These chronicles tell multiple girls' (and some boys') stories
of sexual encounters that, in the vast majority of cases, do
not constitute rape. 6 Nonetheless, the stories are far from
uniformly positive accounts of sexual encounters arising out
of mutual desire and/or love. Instead, they give testament
to a widespread sense of confusion and ignorance among
girls about their own pleasure, and their right to self-
respect and the respect of their partners. 7 The best of these
stories involve girls who had the good fortune to find a
order to avoid pain and suffering).
15. Henderson, supra note 13, at 57-63.
16. See SHARON THOMPSON, GOING ALL THE WAY: TEENAGE GIRLS' TALES OF
SEX, ROMANCE, AND PREGNANCY 17-46 (1995) (noting the initial sexual experi-
ences of various teenage girls and how, although most of them felt they were old
enough and ready to handle sex, virtually all ended-up psychologically devas-
tated and abandoned once the boy ended or left the "relationship," and that,
therefore, the girls did not claim to feel violated or raped, but rather that they
feared pregnancy or being dumped); see also NAOMI WOLF, PROMISCUITIES: THE
SECRET STRUGGLE FOR WOMANHOOD 208-11 (1997). For an examination of girls'
experiences of their own adult-teen relationships, see Lynn M. Phillips, Une-
qual Partners: Exploring Power and Consent in Adult-Teen Relationships (un-
published manuscript, on file with the author).
17. For example, Tracy, a high-school student at the time, grappled with
whether to have sex with eighteen-year-old Don. Don had a "girlfriend" named
Julie, with whom he was having sex. Thompson noted Tracy's confusion over
her "love" for Don and the possibility of him leaving her if she did not have sex
with him. Regardless of her friends telling her to "drop him," Tracy for some
reason could not do it regardless of her knowing that Don was having sex with
Julie. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 20-25. In contrast, Deborah Tolman argues
that girls clearly feel sexual feelings and desires, and are quite aware of these
feelings and how to deal with them. She studied thirty high school girls, and
found that two-thirds of these girls claim to have sexual feelings and desires.
Furthermore, the girls acknowledge the existence of their sexual feelings and
the possible dangers surrounding such feelings. Deborah L. Tolman, Doing De-
sire: Adolescent Girls' Struggles for/with Sexuality, 8 GENDER & Soc'Y 326, 328
(1994).
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partner who was gentle and trustworthy, and who used
contraception. But the majority of the stories fall short of
this ideal, and instead reflect the narrator's sense of disap-
pointment, if not betrayal, and a lack of control over the
timing and circumstances of sex. 8
Even if we presume, for the sake of argument, that
adolescents are like adults in that they can, and perhaps of-
ten do, experience mutually desired, pleasurable sex, there
is considerable evidence of sexual encounters with adoles-
cents that falls into the gray area, short of mutually de-
sired, pleasurable sex, yet also short of rape. Indeed, it
seems that for teens, factors such as immaturity, sexual
naivete, and vulnerability to coercion combine to insure
that many sexual encounters fall far short of the ideal.
A. Rape Law and the Problem of Nonvoluntary Sex Among
Teenagers
Many authors, including myself, have written about the
various factors that make teenage girls susceptible to coer-
cion and abuse in sexual encounters. The vulnerability in-
herent in adolescence, including severely diminished self-
esteem, ambivalence about one's changing body, and a
marked reluctance to assert one's self, leads teenagers to
consent to sexual contact that may not be fully, or even par-
tially, desired. 9 Investigators studying adolescent sexuality
have identified a multiplicity of factors beyond sexual de-
sire and love that lead teenagers to consent to sex. Among
these are fear, confusion, coercion, peer pressure, and a de-
sire for male attention."
18. See THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 29. For the most part, the girls express
their sense that, while sex 'just happened," they were at least partly to blame.
Their curiosity about sex caused them to let sex happen, and even if the encoun-
ter was disappointing, insulting, or painful, they often express some relief at
leaving behind their virginity and the haunting insecurity that they would
never be found desirable by a male.
19. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Mod-
ern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 53-59, 63-70 (1994).
In recent years, several authors have suggested that the socialization process
may be as difficult, although with different manifestations, for adolescent boys
as it is for adolescent girls. See, e.g., CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR
AGAINST BoYs 17-44 (2000); MARY BRAY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE
SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS 203-31 (1995); WILLIAM S. POLLACK, REAL BOY'S
VOICES 12-24 (2000).
20. See infra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Oberman, supra note
2000] 709
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Adolescence is, by definition, a time of transition. As
teenagers navigate the transition from childhood to adult-
hood, they learn by experimentation, by mistake, and by
observation. Because of their inexperience, they are neces-
sarily prone to misjudgment. Nowhere is this tendency to-
ward misjudgment more pernicious than in the area of
sexuality, in which adolescents' age-appropriate naivete
renders them uniquely susceptible to coercion and abuse.
The law of statutory rape reflects an attempt to protect
teenagers from themselves, as well as from those who
would prey upon their vulnerability. It also represents a
necessary complement to conventional rape law, which of-
fers little protection to the teenager who, due to fear, confu-
sion, coercion, or inexperience, has "consented" to unwanted
sex. The following subsection will provide a brief overview
of the law governing forcible rape. This will constitute a
foundation from which to explore the reasons why many
problematic sexual encounters involving teens are not gov-
erned by the law of forcible rape.
1. A Brief Summary of the Law Governing Forcible
Rape. As numerous scholars have demonstrated, over long
centuries, the law governing rape developed more with an
eye toward protecting men from false accusations of rape,
than with a goal of protecting women from sexual assault."
Contemporary rape scholarship amply depicts the manner
in which rape victims historically have been "subjected to
institutionalized sexism, which began with their treatment
by the police, continued through the legal system, much
influenced by notions of victim precipitation and ended
with the acquittal of many de facto rapists."2y At common
law, rules such as the requirement that the victim's
testimony be corroborated by other evidence, that the
victim resist her attacker, and practices such as permitting
the defense to question the woman about her sexual habits,
often led to unjust acquittals.'
Beginning in the 1970s, most states undertook a com-
19, at 54-55 (describing the tactics used by a gang of teenage boys to pressure
girls into consenting to sex).
21. See David Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRmIINOLOGY 1194, 1196 (1997).
22. SuzSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 17 (1987).
23. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 21, at 1196-97.
710 [Vol. 48
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prehensive reform of their rape laws, aiming to eliminate
barriers to effective prosecution and conviction for rape, and
to protect women from the abuses associated with rape
prosecution, as well as from rape itself. Most states, for ex-
ample, eliminated the corroboration and the resistance re-
quirements, along with the "cautionary" instruction re-
garding the ease of making false accusations. 24 Rape shield
laws severely limit the relevance of a woman's sexual his-
tory. In many states, the term "rape" itself was replaced by
"criminal sexual assault," in order to "emphasize that rape
is a crime of violence and not due to an uncontrollable sex-
ual passion."25
In spite of these changes, there is ample evidence that
these reforms have had little or no effect on the outcomes of
rape cases, or the proportions of rapists who are prosecuted
and convicted." Victim blaming remains a significant prob-
lem, particularly in acquaintance rape cases. According to
Professors Bryden and Lengnick, two prominent criminolo-
gists specializing in the study of rape:
[Aictors in the criminal justice system-police, prosecutors, juries,
judges and even victims themselves-tend to be sympathetic to-
wards some types of rape victims but skeptical towards others.
The traditional image of a rapist is a knife-wielding stranger ....
But most rapes are perpetrated by acquaintances of the victim:
lovers, dates, co-workers, neighbors, relatives and so on. The rap-
ist usually does not injure his victim. In these typical cases, atten-
tion usually focuses on the woman's character. If her pre-rape be-
havior violated traditional norms of female prudence or morality,
24. See id. at 1198. But see Thomas Morris, The Empirical, Historical and
Legal Case Against the Cautionary Instruction: A Call for Legislative Reform,
1988 DuKE L.J. 154, 154-55 (1988) (stating that more than half the states allow
cautionary instruction for a variety of purposes).
25. Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform
Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 25, 25-
26 (1987). Nearly all states have eliminated the requirement that a complain-
ant's testimony be corroborated in instances of forcible rape, although some
states retain a corroboration requirement for statutory rape. See Ronald J.
Berger, The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. & SOC'Y REv. 329,
332 (1988). As of 1988, more than half the states continue to allow a cautionary
instruction in forcible rape trials. Morris, supra note 24, at 154-55. See gener-
ally STANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 402 (1989); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State
and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763,
812-905 (1986).
26. JEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LnMrTs OF LAW REFORM 21-23
(1982).
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27
many people blame her instead of the rapist.
In an effort to combat this problem and to insure that
rape is taken seriously, scholars have proposed new re-
forms. Among these is the effort to rewrite laws in a way
that makes central the issue of consent (or nonconsent), as
opposed to force.
Primary among these advocates is Professor Stephen
Schulhofer, whose book, Unwanted Sex, chronicles the fail-
ures of rape law reform, and posits an alternative vision of
rape law-one predicated upon honoring sexual autonomy.
28
Specifically, Professor Schulhofer argues that current for-
mulations of rape law leave many women "unprotected
against coercive sexual abuses that any decent society
should consider morally wrong and legally intolerable."29 In-
stead of focusing on whether force was used to procure con-
sent, Schulhofer advocates a law that would ask "whether
each participant in a sexual encounter had a meaningful
opportunity to choose, and whether a meaningful choice
was in fact made, before sexual penetration occurred.""
But, as Professor Katharine Baker's powerful work on rape
cautions, it is unwise to be overly sanguine about the poten-
tial benefits of rape law reform without an accompanying
reform of society's underlying attitudes toward the crime of
rape.3 Professor Baker's study of acquaintance rape ties the
failure of rape law reforms to the fact that we live in a soci-
ety that has yet to fully internalize the normative prohibi-
tion against the act of forcing a woman to have sex against
her will:
Criminally punishing nonconsensual sex has proved difficult...
precisely because the legal proscription on nonconsensual sex
competes with the masculinity norm, biological theory and popular
belief, all of which re-enforce and legitimate the notion that men
crave sex regardless of consent. Given this tension between the
law and other well-established norms, it should come as little sur-
27. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 21, at 1204 (internal citations omitted).
28. STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAmuRE OF LAW (1998).
29. Id. at x.
30. Id. at 103.
31. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REv. 663,
675-84 (1999) [hereinafter Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame]; see also Katharine K.
Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110
HARv. L. REv. 563, 606-08 (1997) [hereinafter Baker, Once a Rapist?].
712 [Vol. 48
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prise that a sizable number of men have yet to internalize the
moral wrong of nonconsensual sex. And even those men who have
internalized the abstract wrong... have difficulty concretely iden-
tifying what nonconsensual sex is. This difficulty stems both from
well-established sexual behavior roles that shun explicit communi-
cation and from our continuing reluctance to explicitly discuss,
both societally and individually, what consent is. Finally, the con-
stitutional protections afforded defendants make convictions par-
ticularly difficult to secure in cases, like date rape, in which con-
sent is the only issue.
The implications of the limited success of rape law re-
forms are particularly dire for young women. The following
subsection will explore the problem of nonvoluntary sex
among teenagers, demonstrating the ways in which they
simply are not protected by contemporary rape laws.
2. Teenagers and the Problem of Nonvoluntary Sex. In
general, the central inquiry in a rape case asks only
whether intercourse was forced upon the victim; whether
she consented to sex, rather than whether she consented to
sex for reasons that seem problematic. An ideal of mutually
desired, pleasurable sex presupposes that both parties
consent to the sexual encounter out of reasons of sexual
desire and/or love. Social science research indicates that
teenage girls consent to sex for a variety of reasons that lie
well beyond sexual desire and love. As I have noted
elsewhere:
The stories girls tell about the "consensual" sex in which they en-
gage reflect a poignant subtext of hope and pain. Girls express
longing for emotional attachment, romance and respect. At the
same time, they suffer enormous insecurity and diminished self-
image.... Teenage girls recognize that they are, or at least that
they should be, objects of desire.... Girls want boyfriends, rela-
tionships, or somebody who will hold them and tell them that they
are wanted. Girls negotiate access to the fuliUlment of these emo-
tional needs by way of sex.
33
In a sense, this is not terribly different from what we
know about adult women, who consent to sex for reasons
that may range from erotic desire to a sense of economic
dependence, spousal obligation, or a wish to avoid a part-
32. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 31, at 693-94.
33. Oberman, supra note 19, at 65-66 (footnotes omitted).
2000] 713
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ner's anger.3 4 Upon closer examination, however, there is at
least one important difference between girls and women
when it comes to consensual sex: the sexual bargains struck
by girls often are so painfully one-sided that it is difficult
for adults to understand what prompted the girl to con-
sent.35 In this sense, the sexual bargains girls make are
more like the commercial bargains they might make, were
they permitted to act in the marketplace." The combination
of girls' age-appropriate naivete and insecurity and the
norms of male sexual initiative make bad bargains inevita-
ble.
There is an abundance of research that helps us to un-
derstand girls' vulnerability in sexual situations. First,
there is a wealth of information demonstrating the psychic
toll of adolescence on girls. Even though current studies
suggest that girls are succeeding academically, and even
outpacing boys in areas other than math and science, no
one suggests that girls' emotional development into women
is anything but difficult. Between the ages of fifteen and
nineteen, girls manifest disproportionately high rates of de-
pression and anxiety.5 They experience considerably higher
rates than the rest of the population of disorders such as
anorexia and bulimia.39 Although teenage boys are more
likely to commit suicide, teenage girls attempt suicide at
34. See Mary E. Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 198-200 (providing a rich discussion of the many reasons
women consent to heterosexual sex, and the problems inherent in "autonomy
denying" sex).
35. See infra notes 52-54, 62-63, 72, 76-77, and accompanying text; see also
State v. Oliveria, No. 03C01-9611-CR-00417, 1997 WL 600574 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1998) (involving a twenty-five-year-old man who maintained sexual rela-
tionships with two sixteen-year-old girls, promising both of the girls that he
would marry them after they finished high school. During the course of these
relationships, he married another woman, having intercourse with one of the
victims the day after his wedding).
36. The common law recognizes the potential for exploitation in the com-
mercial setting, and protects minors from bad bargains by permitting them to
void their contracts. See, e.g., Oberman, supra note 19, at 43-46.
37. See PIPHER, supra note 19, at 203-31; POLLACK, supra note 19, at 12-24;
SOMERS, supra note 19, at 17-44.
38. See U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERv., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 152-53, 162 (1999).
39. See id. (stating that eating disorders "usually arise in adolescence and
disproportionately affect females" and that "[albout 3 percent of young women
have one of the three main eating disorders: anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa,
or binge-eating disorder").
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twice the rate of teenage boys.4" This discrepancy, in an era
when it is frighteningly easy for teens to acquire the means
to kill themselves, speaks to a certain passive-aggressive ef-
fort on the part of these girls to communicate their despera-
tion. Obviously, these troubling statistics describe only the
extremes, and most girls do not experience such marked
distortions in their sense of self or well-being. Nonetheless,
their very extreme nature helps to illuminate the problems
of self-doubt, insecurity and depression that are so com-
monplace among girls that we scarcely notice them.4
When it comes to issues of sexuality, in spite of several
decades of sexual "liberation," including effective contracep-
tion and legalized abortion, this remains a society rife with
sexual double-standards. As in the past, boys and men are
expected, if not encouraged, to engage in sex whenever the
opportunity presents itself, and their reputation is en-
hanced to the extent that they are seen as sexually experi-
enced.42 Girls, on the other hand, have inherited the highly
stigmatized norms governing female sexuality. "Slut" has
not become an accolade, and to date, there are no male
counterparts for this derogatory term for a sexually active
female. Although the "majority of Americans no longer view
premarital intercourse as wrong, and the media bombards
teens with scenes of sexual involvement and innuendo,""
there are few positive role models for teenage girls seeking
40. See id. at 152.
41. See Oberman, supra note 19, at 55-56 ("The most pervasive finding of
the 'post-Gilligan' psychologists who have dedicated their research to the study
of girls' development is that among girls, adolescence is a time of acute crisis, in
which self-esteem, body image, academic confidence and the willingness to
speak out decline precipitously.").
42. See Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 31, at 693 ("Having sex
demonstrates one's heterosexuality which demonstrates one's masculinity and
masculinity brings with it the esteem of one's peers."). Baker cites numerous
studies demonstrating the continued vitality of this norm, and provides a rich
discussion of the impact of this norm on the problem of acquaintance rape. Id.
43. Robin Warshaw & Andrea Parrot, The Contribution of Sex-Role Sociali-
zation to Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HDDEN CRIME 75
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) ("From their socialization in
childhood and adolescence, [boys and girls] develop different goals related to
sexuality.... [Mien are supposed to single-mindedly go after sexual intercourse
with a female, regardless of how they do it .... [Women should passively ac-
quiesce or use any strategy to avoid sexual intercourse.").
44. Deborah L. Rhode, Adolescent Pregnancy and Public Policy, in THE
POLITICS OF PREGNANCY 301, 316 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds.,
1993).
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to explore, express, or experience their own sexuality. In-
stead, girls aim to be found attractive by males, and they
tend to view sexual pleasure, for the most part, as some-
thing that their partners derive from them, or that they
give to their partners." To the extent they deviate from this
pattern, they jeopardize their feminine identity, and their
relationship to men. As the author of one study of acquain-
tance rape cases observes:
Th[e] overriding theme of female silence as the mark of a good
woman expresses itself in numerous variations in our general cul-
ture and in our conceptions of rape. A woman need not literally be
silent. She may speak if her voice soothes, entertains, informs or
otherwise helps to serve male needs. What she may not do is ex-
press her own needs or views .... 46
As I said at the outset of this section, adolescence is, by
definition, a transition to adulthood that is traversed
through trial and error experimentation. The bad bargains
girls strike in their forays into sexual activity are a direct
result of society's archaic double-standards encouraging
them to be flattered and compliant when a male finds them
desirable, coupled with the self-doubt and insecurity that
marks their stage of development.
There is ample evidence of these bad bargains in con-
temporary social science literature. Several recent studies
suggest that a considerable proportion of adolescents expe-
rience sexual intercourse under conditions that are less
than mutually desired and pleasurable. The first among
these is a study of 2933 women between the ages of fifteen
and twenty-four, which asked women to estimate the extent
to which their first sexual intercourse had been desired.47
The survey used a Likkens scale of one to ten, in which one
meant they really did not want it to happen, and ten meant
45. See Oberman, supra note 19, at 64.
46. Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 440 (1996).
47. See Joyce Abma et al., Young Women's Degree of Control Over First In-
tercourse: An Exploratory Analysis, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12, 12-18 (1998). An-
other study found that females were more likely to feel bad and used after their
first experience with intercourse. However, no difference was found between
males and females in regards to feeling guilty after intercourse. Maria Donald
et al., Gender Differences Associated with Young People's Emotional Reactions to
Sexual Intercourse, 24 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 453, 462 (1995).
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they really wanted it to happen." Instead, they sought the
women's subjective assessment of voluntariness when ask-
ing them to classify their sexual encounters. Twenty-five
percent of the women reported that, while their first sexual
intercourse had not been forced, neither had it been
wanted. Interestingly, the younger the woman's age at first
intercourse, the more likely she was to report it as un-
wanted. Of those who were age fifteen at first intercourse,
28% assigned a ranking of four or below on the scale of vol-
untariness. Indeed, 25% of those whose age at first inter-
course was less than fourteen described their first inter-
course as completely "nonvoluntary," as did 10% of those
who were fifteen.
A related study reveals startlingly high rates of "forced"
sexual encounters among adolescents. Specifically, this
study found that the earlier one begins having sex, the
more likely one is to have experienced force or coercion in a
sexual context. Indeed, 74% of those who had intercourse
before age fourteen and 60% of those who had sex before
age fifteen report having had a forced sexual experience. 9
Some "consensual" sexual encounters with young people
so clearly violate cultural norms that it is easy for us to rec-
ognize them as coercive and nonvoluntary. For instance,
few would argue that the law should countenance a "con-
sensual" sexual relationship between a step-father and his
step-daughter, or between a mother's live-in boyfriend and
her teenage daughter, or between a junior high school
teacher and his or her pupil. But the problem of less than
fully voluntary sexual encounters extends well beyond the
cases of obvious abuse of authority and overreaching. The
following section will illustrate this problem through the
presentation of several cases.
B. Nonvoluntary Sexual Contact among Adolescents: Case
Studies
There are a variety of factors that contribute to the
48. See Abma, supra note 47; see also ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS,
SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARING ADOLESCENTS FOR RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 232-
33 (2000) (noting that a full 92% of adolescent sexual victimizations take place
in acquaintance situations, and that adolescents overwhelmingly tend not to
report this victimization to authorities because "they blame themselves or do
not regard the crime as a "real rape").
49. Donovan, supra note 10, at 30.
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problem of nonvoluntary, yet "consensual" sex among ado-
lescents. I selected the following cases to illustrate five
common themes that may be observed in nonvoluntary sex-
ual encounters with teens. These factors or themes are not
necessarily discrete. Rather, they may all be at play in vari-
ous guises in each of the following cases. I have listed the
cases in order, ranging from what I perceive to be the most
to the least overly coercive encounters.
1. Intimidation and "Consensual" Sex. At least twice in
recent years, the national media have become fascinated by
cases involving predominantly white, middle-class teenage
boys who procure sex from teenage girls through the use of
peer pressure and coercion. In the early 1990s, there was
the Spur Posse.50 More recently, there was a scandal
involving several wealthy Gross Pointe, Michigan high
school seniors, and some freshmen girls." The girls, ages
fourteen and fifteen, were targeted early in their freshman
year, and did not have prior relationships with the boys.
The boys, who were in the "popular" crowd, invited the girls
to one of the boy's homes, where they were given soft drinks
spiked with alcohol. The boys then undressed and "asked"
the girls to perform fellatio on them. Even if one believes
the boys' accounts of these encounters, it is difficult to
classify them as mutually desired, pleasurable, and wholly
50. Oberman, supra note 19, at 15-18. In 1993, a group of teenage boys
called the Spur Posse developed a "game" in which members of the group sought
to score points by having sexual encounters with as many females as possible.
Members scored points for each time a girl gave them an orgasm. These teen-
age boys each had sexual relations with anywhere from twenty to seventy-three
different girls. Many of these girls came forward and claimed they were raped
by members of the Spur Posse. The Spur Posse had made headlines in national
newspapers from the Sacramento Bee to The New York Times; in national news
magazines such as Time and Newsweek; in literary magazines such as The New
Yorker, in women's magazines such as Glamour and Seventeen; and in popular
publications such as Rolling Stone. Furthermore, the story was discussed on
National Public Radio, Nightline, and the members themselves appeared on
Dateline NBC, The Home Show, as well as talk shows hosted by Phil Donahue,
Montel Williams, Maury Povich, Jenny Jones, and Jane Whitney. Id.; see also
Amy Cunningham, Sex in High School, GLAMOUR, Sept. 1993, at 253; Joan Di-
dion, Trouble in Lakewood, NEW YORKER, July 26, 1993, at 46; David Ferrell, 8
High School Students Held in Rape, Assault Case, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at
Al.
51. Joe Swickard, "Wrong, Wrong, Wrong": Jail-Bound Grosse Pointe Teen
Admits "Mistake," But Says Girls Share Blame, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 15,
1998, at 1A.
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consensual. The imbalance of power is profound. The girls
were not only younger, lacking in social experience as well
as social status, but they were alone inside of one of the
boy's homes, and they did not drive. These encounters did
not occur in the context of safe, let alone loving
relationships. The boys appropriated the girls perhaps
because their very youth and naivete made them unlikely to
resist their advances. It is hard to imagine that those
involved would describe these encounters as meriting a
"ten" or even a "seven" on a one-to-ten scale of
voluntariness.
Several months after these encounters, one of the fe-
male victims went to the authorities with her complaint.
The Grosse Pointe case resulted in a conviction and brief
sentence for one of the perpetrators." The other two boys
were sentenced to misdemeanor charges in plea bargains
that placed them in jail for sixty to ninety days, followed by
probation. The girl who made the complaint was the target
of venomous attacks from classmates, all replayed by the
media, and from the perpetrator himself. Throughout the
case, the perpetrator continued to refer to their contact as
"consensual," or, when he was obligated to express some
remorse in an effort to secure a lenient punishment, as evi-
dence of a youthful mistake made both by himself and by
his victim.'
A more complicated version of this " 'consensual sex' by
intimidation" dynamic may be observed in a recent Chicago
case.54 On a cold Monday morning in January 2000, a father
appeared at an elementary school in Humbolt Park, a poor,
predominantly African American and Latino neighborhood,
to inquire whether his twelve-year-old daughter was pres-
ent that day. He stated that he had not seen her since Fri-
day morning when she left for school. When his daughter
was brought to the principal's office, she related the fol-
lowing story:
Sandra (a pseudonym) and her eleven-year-old girl-
52. Id. Grosse Pointe High School student body president, Daniel Granger,
led his friends in the assaults. In his statement to the court, he claimed his ac-
tions were wrong, but that the girls were equally to blame. Granger was sen-
tenced to four-and-a-half months in jail, followed by nineteen-and-a-half months
probation and 200 hours community service.
53. Id.
54. Telephone Interview with Lisa Lopez Palmer, Rape Victim Advocate,
Metro Chicago YWCA (Jan. 12, 2000).
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friend were hanging out at the park on Friday evening
when two male teenagers, both affiliated with a gang, ap-
proached them. The boys were older teens, and they offered
to take the girls to a nearby motel room. The girls accepted
the offer, and they stayed in the motel room until Monday
morning, when they went to school. During the course of
the weekend, both girls had sexual intercourse with these
two boys, and later, with ten of their friends. In all, by
Monday morning, each girl had experienced intercourse
with at least twelve different partners.
Upon hearing this story, the principal contacted a Chi-
cago Police Officer. He arrived and interviewed the girls to-
gether, in front of the school officials and Sandra's father.
Although he pressed the girls to name their partners, nei-
ther girl would cooperate. Later, the girls were interviewed
separately by detectives. Both girls insisted that they had
wanted to have sex with these boys, and that they did not
want to get them in trouble.
Before the police officer left the school, Sandra's father
asked whether there would be further criminal investiga-
tion, and whether charges would be filed against the boys
(and possibly men) who had done this to the girls. Illinois
outlaws any sexual contact with someone age twelve or un-
der, regardless of the age of the perpetrator.55 The police of-
ficer said that any further action was unlikely, because the
girls' refusal to cooperate made it impossible for the police
to proceed.
In considering this case, it is critical to explore the girls'
resistance to cooperating with the police, and to consider
what these girls might have risked had they identified their
partners. First of all, they may not have seen themselves as
victims. Their willingness to go along with these guys may
have stemmed from curiosity, from fear, from a sense of
flattery at having been the target of male sexual interest, or
from a combination of the three. Even if, in retrospect, they
were feeling abused, self-identifying as a victim requires
public acknowledgment of extremely personal feelings of
shame and humiliation, and the risk of social ostracism
from being identified as dirty. Additionally, because of the
power of the gangs in their neighborhood, these girls risked
being viewed as police collaborators, and they may have
justifiably feared for their personal welfare, and that of
55. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14.1 (2000).
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their families.
Nonetheless, it is absurd to consider these encounters
consensual. It is critical to note that, despite the racial and
class differences, the wealthy white Grosse Pointe boys and
the poor Latino gang-bangers both selected their victims
because of, not in spite of, their ages. Despite the fact that
both the victims and the perpetrators in each of these cases
were teenagers, these cases involved predatory sex. Both
sets of perpetrators chose their victims because they were
younger, less certain of themselves, and far less likely to be
sexually experienced than are older girls. As such they were
more easily intimidated into consenting to sex, which
meant the boys could get the sex they wanted without hav-
ing to use physical force."
2. Acquiescence and "Consensual sex." This case is
drawn from an appellate court opinion. The facts provide a
textbook illustration of an adolescent girl who acquiesces
rather than attempting to resist a sexual encounter:
On February 28, 1996, S.Q., then 13 years old, arrived home from
school and began doing her homework and watching t.v. in her
living room. Appellant, [Joshua Hemme,] age 19, called and
wanted her to come over. She did not want to because she had a lot
of homework, but he kept asking, so she asked her stepfather if
she could go over to Appellant's house and he said yes. S.Q. had
been seeing Appellant's younger brother Adam 'and had been to
the Hemmes' house before. When S.Q. arrived, Appellant took her
into the basement, where the recreation room and Adam's bed-
room were located. At Appellant's request, she sat on the bed. Ap-
pellant asked S.Q. if she was scared to have sex. She responded
that she was not scared, but did not really want to. Appellant took
off S.Q.'s clothes and threw them away from the bed. He put his
head between her legs and started to perform oral sex. He pushed
S.Q.'s head to his penis and she performed oral sex on him. Ap-
pellant then got on top of her and had sexual intercourse. He
asked her if it hurt and she said yes, but Appellant kept going.
When they heard Appellant's mother arrive home, S.Q. wiped the
56. Note also that an additional attribute of this very young victim is that
she is less likely to be infected with any sexually transmitted diseases. Larry
Clark's 1995 film, KIDs (Shining Excalibur 1995), was a particularly grim por-
trayal of this phenomenon. It featured a band of teenage boys who preyed upon
young female virgins in an effort to avoid HIV and other STDs.
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semen off of her leg and got dressed. She went out into the recrea-
tion room area and began to play Nintendo. Appellant began fin-
gering her vagina and asked her to have sex again. She said no.
Appellant kept asking. Eventually, S.Q. sat on the bed, Appellant
pulled down her pants, and Appellant yelled at her to scoot up and
put her legs around his neck. Appellant had sexual intercourse
with her again. 5S.Q. put her clothes on and Appellant took her
home in his van.
These facts vividly illustrate the gray area between
consent and rape. Had he been charged with rape, one can
imagine that the appellant would have argued that S.Q. ei-
ther consented to, or failed to voice her opposition to both
sexual acts, and that there was no force involved in these
acts of intercourse. On the other hand, this case involved a
thirteen-year-old virgin who was being pushed around by
her "boyfriend's" older brother. This man pestered and ca-
joled her into coming over to his home, whereupon he ig-
nored her bravado-filled response that she was not "scared
to have sex," but simply "didn't want to." This man, with
whom she had no prior relationship, took off her clothes and
began performing sex acts upon her, even after she told him
it hurt. "No" should mean "No" here, and S.Q.'s plain
statement that she did not want to have sex makes this en-
counter a rape. However, for the reasons cited in the previ-
ous subsection, her acquiescence likely would undermine
the chances that Hemme could be convicted for such a
rape.58 But even if one agrees that her failure to object more
persistently insulates the defendant from charges of forcible
rape, his sexual conduct was morally reprehensible.
Under the facts recited by the court, it is hard to argue
that this encounter should be legally permissible. And in-
deed, the court upheld Mr. Hemme's conviction. What is
perhaps more interesting about the case is to consider the
response it might have generated had these parties not
been separated by an age difference of six years. Under
Missouri law, this encounter would not have been criminal
had the victim been age fourteen, rather than thirteen. "
Nonetheless, everything we know about adolescent devel-
57. Missouri v. Hemme, 969 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. 1998).
58. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
59. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.032 (1999) (defining statutory rape in the first
degree as encompassing any person who has sexual intercourse with a person
under age fourteen).
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opment suggests that the same encounter could have oc-
curred. Perhaps with one more year of life experience, the
victim would have felt better able to resist Hemme's sexual
advances, but that seems unlikely. Indeed, it seems quite
plausible to imagine the same encounter occurring even if
Hemme himself had been younger, just say age sixteen to
S.Q.'s thirteen. The problem at issue in this case is not
merely the age difference between the parties, but rather,
the girl's inability to protect herself against being coerced to
participate in unwanted sexual encounter.
3. Adolescent Naivete and "Consensual" Sex. One of the
most troubling aspects of the relatively promiscuous pres-
ent climate regarding adolescent sexuality is the demise of
foreplay. In the 1950s, "petting was the most common ado-
lescent sexual experience for girls."" Petting is a sexual
learning experience, a way to discover how to feel pleasure.
Petting continued to be a common adolescent sexual prac-
tice through the 1960s and 1970s, but in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, many teenagers came to think of petting, in-
cluding foreplay, as "kid stuff."6 For many young people to-
day, sexual intercourse is simply what you do when you like
someone. This trend is evidenced by the decline in average
age at first intercourse, which many experts believe will
continue to fall in coming years.62 As one psychologist re-
ports about her early teenage female clientele, "They went
to a party, met a cute guy, he seemed to like them, they
hooked up and did what they assumed everyone was doing.
Then, they feel awful."63
60. Sharon Thompson, Putting a Big Thing into a Little Hole: Teenage Girls'
Accounts of Sexual Initiation, 27 J. SEX RES. 341, 357 (1990).
61. Id.
62. Dr. Richard Gallagher, of New York University's Child Study Center
notes, "I see no reason not to believe that soon a substantial number of youths
will be having intercourse in the middle-school years.... It's already happen-
ing." Anne Jarrell, The Face of Teenage Sex Grows Younger, N.Y. TIMES, April 2,
2000, § 9, at 1. In a 1992 survey, 70% of teens reported being sexually active by
twelfth grade (seventeen to eighteen years old). See Elizabeth C. Cooksey et al.,
The Initiation of Adolescent Sexual and Contraceptive Behavior During Chang-
ing Times, 37 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 59 (1996) (citing Centers for Disease
Control, Sexual Behavior Among High School Students, 267 JAMA 628 (1992)).
Finally, a 1995 study found that the median age of sexual initiation was 16.5
years. See Warren et al., supra note 1, at 171; see also supra note 4 and accom-
panying text.
63. Jarrell, supra note 62, § 9, at I (quoting Dr. Marsha Levy-Warren).
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The following story, summarized from a 1996 Florida
case," illustrates precisely the casual and mechanical na-
ture that these sexual encounters represent. Driven by a
"crush," the thirteen-year-old victim naively responds to an
older male's momentary sexual attention by consenting to
sexual contact and intercourse:
The victim, age thirteen, was playing on backyard
trampoline when she was approached by two boys, ages six-
teen and seventeen, one of whom she had previously
"dated." The boys asked her if they could perform cunnilin-
gus on her. She hesitated. They persisted until she acqui-
esced. As she was pulling her pants down, a third male, age
nineteen, approached and asked to join in. She reported
feeling uncomfortable, but said she complied because she
liked the nineteen-year-old, and felt special because he was
older and was interested in her. The two original boys per-
formed cunnilingus, but stopped after she indicated that
she wasn't enjoying it. The nineteen-year-old then began
manipulating her genitals. One of the other boys asked her
to perform fellatio. She fondled him instead. He then re-
quested intercourse, but was unable to achieve an erection.
The nineteen-year-old then ordered the other two to leave,
and asked the victim to have intercourse. She consented.
He proceeded with anal intercourse, while she was kneeling
on the trampoline. She screamed in pain, and attempted to
leave. The nineteen-year-old then lowered her to the ground
and entered her vaginally. One of the other boys had left a
condom behind, which the nineteen-year-old did not use.
Despite the fact that Florida law penalizes all sexual
contact with one under age eighteen as a "sexual battery,"
the sixteen- and seventeen-year-old males were not prose-
cuted. The nineteen-year-old, who could have been charged
with a capital felony for his acts, was convicted only of
committing a lewd act on a minor. In addition, the trial
court granted him a downward departure sentence, on the
basis that the "victim was engaged in consensual acts with
others immediately prior to having consensual sex with the
defendant."
65
The fact that the defendant was not charged with rape
is not a fluke. Many have written about the difficulty of get-
64. State v. Smith, 668 So.2d 639, 640-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
65. Id. at 642 (emphasis added) (vacating the trial court's downward depar-
ture sentence and remanding for resentencing within guidelines).
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ting judges, juries, and prosecutors to take seriously the
crime of rape when it occurs between acquaintances."
Prosecutors, worried about whether they might succeed in
obtaining a conviction against a defendant when the victim
initially consented to some sexual contact, often opt for the
easier route of a statutory rape charge.67 And the trial
court's response to this victim-viewing her as a "loose" girl
who had consented to sexual contact with all three boys,
rather than as the victim of unwanted anal penetration,
and a subsequent vaginal rape-validates the prosecutors'
fears. Just as was seen in the Michael M. case, judges tied
to the view that every sexual encounter is either sex or rape
may be unable to recognize the considerable violence that
may accompany an adolescent's consent to sex.68
This failing has disastrous consequences for young girls
who are the victims of unwanted sexual contact. Even if she
had consented to intercourse under such humiliating cir-
cumstances, an older girl or an adult woman might have
managed to escape after the anal rape, or at least might
have clearly articulated her objection to the perpetrator's
actions. (Of course, it seems preposterous to imagine a more
experienced girl or woman consenting to intercourse under
these circumstances.) On the contrary, the thirteen-year-old
was more passive, as is typical of early adolescents. The ex-
tent to which she was inclined to confuse male sexual atten-
tion with true affection, her willingness to consent to inter-
course in order to honor that male attention, and her failure
to object more vociferously to conduct that was no longer
66. See the sources cited in notes 31, 41, and 47, supra, for a discussion of
the barriers to conviction in acquaintance rape settings. Note that this appears
to be a problem in the context of statutory rape, as well. For example, on the
program of the annual 3Rs conference, sponsored by the California Statutory
Vertical Rape Prosecution Program, was a workshop session presented by Rori
Robinson, J.D., San Diego County District Attorney, entitled, "Convincing a
Judge Your Victim is a Victim." Rori Robinson, Convincing a Judge Your Victim
is a Victim, address at the 3Rs Conference of the California Statutory Vertical
Rape Prosecution Program, in Visalia, Calif. (May 3, 2000).
67. In my informal discussions with California prosecutors at the 3R confer-
ence, it was clear this practice was commonplace, if troubling. Hence, the con-
ference organizer's focus on helping judges, juries, and victims to recognize the
harm in statutory rape.
68. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981);
see also Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis,
63 TEx. L. REV. 387, 415-17 (discussing the violence and coercion in this case).
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desired all reflect her relative youth and powerlessness.6 9 In
this case, her age-appropriate naivete rendered this victim
legally rapable.
4. Silence and "Consensual" Sex. A key problem in dis-
cerning consent to sex among teenagers stems from the con-
fusion that informs sexual encounters involving inexperi-
enced partners who are relative strangers. Societal norms
discourage explicit communication about or during sexual
intimacy.7 In addition to this, societal norms encourage
male aggression and female passivity. 2 The following case
illustrates the perplexing sort of sexual interaction that can
take place at the intersection of these various factors. The
story is drawn from an appellate court opinion." Both the
victim and the defendant were high school students. The
victim, age fourteen, was the manager of the school football
team, and the defendant, age sixteen, was a football player.
On September 21, 1994, the victim attended football practice and
performed her usual duties.... At the end of practice, the defen-
69. See Oberman, supra note 19, at 65-66.
70. A second profoundly disturbing example of adolescent naivete and "con-
sensual" sex is seen in the stories of two HI'V-infected sexual predators,
Nushawn Williams, of New York, and Darnell "Boss Man" McGee, of East Saint
Louis who passed on their HTV infection to scores of women through heterosex-
ual encounters. Given what is known about adolescents' limited capacity to pro-
tect themselves from abusive or high-risk situations, it is not surprising that
many of these men's victims were teenagers. And indeed, newspaper articles
noted that many of Williams' twenty-eight partners, and Boss Man's seventeen
partners were under age sixteen. See HIV-Positive Man Charged, TORONTO
STAR, Aug. 20, 1998, at A14; Man with HIV is Charged with Having Sex with
Teen, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 1998, at A16; Vengeful Woman Tried to
Spread HIV, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 31, 1998, at P3A; Hannah Wolfson,
HIV-Positive Tennessee Woman May Have Found "Revenge" With 50 Men,
CICAGO TRIB., July 31, 1998, at C2; Hannah Wolfson, HIV-Positive Woman
"Getting Revenge", CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, July 31, 1998, at C6; Hannah
Wolfson, Woman, 29, Accused of Spreading HIV, BUFFALO NEWS, July 31, 1998,
at 9A. Unfortunately, none of those writing about these cases noted that these
men might have sought out these very young partners because they were easier
prey. No one mentioned that these encounters were illegal and exploitative, re-
gardless of the men's HIV status.
71. See Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 31, at 688-89 (discussing
negative reaction to Antioch College's Sexual Offense Policy, which required a
person to obtain the verbal consent of his or her sexual partner prior to moving
to a higher level of sexual intimacy in an interaction).
72. See SANDRA LIPsITz BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE
DEBATE ON SEXUAL EQUALITY 163 (1993).
73. State v. Jason B., 702 A.2d 895 (Conn. App. 1997) (citation omitted).
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dant offered the victim a ride to her home .... The defendant also
agreed to drive another player on the football team to his home.
The defendant drove toward the home of the other player ....
During the ride, the defendant and the other player made some
remarks about the victim's breasts. The defendant also said he in-
tended to have the victim perform oral sex on him.
After leaving the other player at his home, the defendant drove
around for a short while and finally entered a cemetery driveway.
He drove to the rear of the cemetery and parked the car. He and
the victim kissed for awhile, and then he unzipped his pants. At
trial, the victim testified that the defendant forced her to perform
fellatio, but the trial court concluded that the state failed to sus-
tain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the element
of compulsion.
7 4
This story contains within it at least two potentially
"true" stories. ' From the defendant's perspective, one might
imagine a degree of puzzlement that the victim complained
about their encounter. Conceivably, he may have believed
that their interaction was completely consensual, and took
place in accordance with the unwritten rules governing
sexual interactions among his peers. He was two years
ahead of her in school and a football player. As such, he
might have imagined that a younger girl would be flattered
by the fact that he noticed her, let alone offered to drive her
home. When she agreed to ride home with him, and sat qui-
etly while he and his teammate made sexual remarks, per-
haps he presumed she understood that he was interested in
her sexually. She did not object when, rather than driving
her home, he drove around looking for a place to "park." Nor
did she complain when they began kissing. In fact, she said
nothing when he unzipped his pants and had her perform
fellatio on him. So, from his point of view, this might have
seemed like a perfectly consensual encounter.
From the victim's perspective, the encounter apparently
read quite differently. Her silence in the car, when the boys
74. Id. at 896-87.
75. As Kim Scheppele notes, "Given the current state of divergent percep-
tions of men and women, the... troubling question for law is not the question
of truth and falsehood, but instead the question of which true version of a par-
ticular story should be adopted as the official version of what happened." Kim
Lane Scheppele, The RE-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CMl. L. REV. 1095, 1111
(1987) (emphasis omitted).
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joked about her breasts, may have reflected her extreme
discomfort. There were two of them, both bigger than her,
one assumes, and in addition, what could she have said that
would not have opened her to further stigma and humilia-
tion? When the defendant started driving around, rather
than taking her directly home, several things may have
been going through her mind. She may have been inter-
ested in the prospect of a romantic relationship with him.
After all, his status as an older student and a football
player might have made him seem appealing to her. So,
perhaps she was hopeful that they would park somewhere
and talk, getting to know one another. On the other hand,
she might have been silent because she was scared, uncer-
tain where he was taking her, and frightened by the plans
he had announced to his teammate. If so, the situation
might have seemed to be rapidly escalating out of her con-
trol, and if she had never before been in a such a situation,
she would have had little sense of how best to defuse the
danger that she was in.
Nor was her passivity once the defendant initiated
physical contact necessarily indicative of consent. It is quite
possible for women to "freeze" out of fear. Indeed, in one
study of acquaintance rape, author Eugene Kanin identified
five cases in which the women were "actually immobilized
with fear," and therefore could not even communicate their
nonconsent.76 As in the other cases discussed in this section,
what made this victim vulnerable to unwanted sex was
nothing other than her age and gender-appropriate behav-
ior.
5. The Legacy of Child and Adolescent Sexual Abuse
and "Consensual" Sex. In reflecting upon stories describing
nonconsensual sexual encounters with adolescents, it is
relatively easy to imagine the acute consequences for the
victim. There is an almost palpable feeling of pain and
humiliation, as well as a profound sense of injustice. What
is less obvious is the chronic harm that may result from
such interactions.
Considerable research on the consequences of sexual
abuse suggests that young victims of nonconsensual sexual
encounters face a heightened risk of depression and other
76. See Eugene Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9
VIcmnoLoGY 95, 97 (1984).
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psychosocial disorders, promiscuity, and revictimization as
a result of their experience.' It is estimated that as many
as 63% of female adolescent sexual assault victims experi-
ence some form of psychosocial complications. 8 These com-
plications may include depression, guilt, shame, phobias,
and eating disorders." Indeed, 67% of female victims of
interfamilial abuse and 49% of victims of nonfamilial abuse
report experiencing some or all of these symptoms.0 Addi-
tional research suggests lower self-esteem, higher rates of
emotional distress, and considerably elevated rates of sui-
cide and self-harm among survivors of sexual victimiza-
tion.8
A second consequence of the sexual victimization of
young people is compulsive or addictive behavior. Numer-
ous studies document a tendency toward sexual promiscuity
among survivors of childhood sexual exploitation.82 Experts
believe that this promiscuity results from an early exposure
to adult sexual activity, and the blurring of sexual and emo-
tional boundaries, such that the young person learns to
77. For the most part, the studies investigating the long-term effects of sex-
ual victimization are somewhat general in scope. That is, they focus on sexual
abuse, which is broadly defined to include girls who are victims of forcible rape,
incest, and other forms of coerced sexual encounters. See, e.g., ALAN W. McEvoY
& EDSEL L. ERICKSON, YOUTH AND EXPLOITATION (1990); Erica R. Gold, Long-
Term Effects of Sexual Victimization in Childhood: An Attributional Approach,
54 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 471 (1986). Although there is some lack
of precision in the definition of terms such as "abuse," this body of research re-
flects a collective exploration of the long-term effects of exploitative sexual en-
counters on young people. As such, its general conclusions are useful to those
seeking to estimate the impact of nonconsensual sexual encounters on adoles-
cents.
78. Angela Browne & David Finkelhor, Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A Re-
view of the Research, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 66, 67 (1986).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Gold, supra note 77, at 473; Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 78, at
70. Indeed, one study found that 54% of sexually abused girls suffered from
panic attacks, 72% reported difficulty sleeping, and 64% felt isolated and stig-
matized. John Briere, The Effects of Childhood Sexual Abuse on Later Psycho-
logical Functioning: Defining a "Post-Sexual-Abuse Syndrome" (paper presented
at the Third National Conference on Sexual Victimization of Children, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1984), cited in Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 78, at 70.
82. Alice Mayall & Steven Gold, Definitional Issues and Mediating Variable
in the Sexual Revictimization of Women Sexually Abused as Children, 10 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 26, 38 (1995); Robert J. Timms & Patrick Connors,
Adult Promiscuity Following Childhood Sexual Abuse: An Introduction, 8
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE PROMISCUOUS PATIENT 19 (1992).
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seek emotional support and a feeling of self-worth by way of
sexual behavior.83 Commentators suggest that little of this
"hypersexuality" is gratifying for these women. Instead, the
women report intensified feelings of anxiety, guilt, and
shame.' Additionally, survivors of abusive encounters may
develop a "sexual script" and come to model future sexual
interactions based on their early, exploitative experiences.85
Thus, victims may come to eroticize the power differentials
inherent in the exploitative relationship she survived. This
may help to explain Diana Russell's finding that between
38% and 48% of survivors of child sexual abuse had physi-
cally abusive husbands, compared with 17% of women who
were not child sexual abuse victims." Finally, research sug-
gests that a startlingly high percentage of adult female
prostitutes are survivors of childhood sexual abuse. One
study of 136 prostitutes found that 55% had their first sex-
ual encounter as children, with someone ten or more years
their senior.8 7 Sixty-five percent of these women reported
having been forced into sexual activity before age sixteen.88
Inherent in the foregoing is the problem of revictimiza-
tion. Survivors of early and exploitative sexual relations are
at increased risk for further abuse as they move through
adolescence and into adulthood. This revictimization may
take the form of sexual assault. A 1992 study reported that
44% of women who were abused before the age of eighteen
were revictimized at least once in adulthood. Other mani-
festations of the vulnerability of survivors of sexual exploi-
tation are the elevated rates of sexually transmitted dis-
eases and pregnancy experienced by this population. One
study found that women who were victims of adult-child sex
were 3.4 times more likely than non-victims to have eleven
or more sexual partners after eighteen years of age, and 1.6
times more likely to become infected with a sexually trans-
83. Timms & Connors, supra note 82, at 20.
84. Id.
85. Christopher R. Browning & Edward 0. Laumann, Sexual Contact Be.
tween Children and Adults: A Life Course Perspective, 62 AMi. Soc. REv. 540,
543 (1997).
86. Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 78, at 70 (citing DIANE RUSSELL, THE
SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GILs AND WOMEN (1999)).
87. Id. at 71.
88. Id.
89. Gail E. Wyatt et al., Differential Effects of Women's Child Sexual Abuse
and Subsequent Sexual Revictimization, 60 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 167, 169 (1992).
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mitted disease." Additionally, at least one study has shown
that a high percentage of girls who experience early teenage
pregnancy have a history of childhood sexual trauma."
As compelling as this body of research is, it is some-
times difficult to know the extent to which an individual's
present life choices may be shaped by these pathologies. For
example, consider the following story:
A fifteen-year-old Latina came to Children's Memorial
Hospital in Chicago, seeking an abortion. Her physician
elicited the following information from her: The girl lives
with her twenty-year-old boyfriend, her thirty-five-year-old
mother, her siblings, ages fourteen and eleven, and the
girl's own children, ages three and eighteen months. All of
them live in her boyfriend's apartment. No one in the fam-
ily has legal documentation permitting them to reside in
this country. The boyfriend works full-time, and is sup-
porting the girl and her entire family. The girl had her first
child at age twelve, as a result of a rape by a forty-year-old
man who was then living nearby her family. Her second
child is also result of a nonconsensual sexual encounter
with a different forty-year-old man who was living with the
family.
The girl describes her current boyfriend as "nice," and
claims that the pregnancy was the result of consensual in-
tercourse. She is the primary caretaker of her children, and
she routinely cares for her siblings, as well.92
The relationship between this girl and her twenty-year-
old partner clearly violates Illinois law, which defines as a
class two felony any sexual contact between adults and mi-
nors between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.93 At first
blush, the law seems like overkill. The girl describes the
relationship as consensual, and given her remarkable un-
dertaking in parenting both her siblings and her own chil-
dren, she seems to be sufficiently mature to make decisions
about her sexuality. Upon closer examination, however, the
case presents some troubling indications that this girl may
be quite vulnerable. First of all, she is pregnant and wishes
90. Browning & Laumann, supra note 85, at 550.
91. Catherine Stevens-Simon & Susan Reichert, Sexual Abuse, Adolescent
Pregnancy, and Child Abuse: A Developmental Approach to an Intergenerational
Cycle, 148 ARCHIvES OF PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MED. 23 (1994).
92. Interview with Cindy Mears, M.D., Chicago, Ill., Children's Memorial
Hospital, in Chicago, Ill. (March 17, 2000).
93. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16(4)(d) (West 1993).
20001
HeinOnline  -- 48 Buff. L. Rev. 731 2000
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to terminate her pregnancy. This means that, at the very
least, she has had intercourse without effective contracep-
tion, despite her desire to avoid becoming pregnant. Obvi-
ously, not all unwanted pregnancies result from coercive
sexual encounters, but the fact of an unwanted pregnancy
raises the possibility that her partner is not taking into ac-
count her desire to avoid pregnancy when they engage in
sexual relations.
More importantly, we know that she is a survivor of at
least two sexually abusive encounters-encounters that she
terms "rapes." This means that she may be particularly
susceptible to exploitative relationships as she moves into
adulthood. At this point, it is impossible to know whether
her current relationship is abusive, but we can be sure that
there is an extraordinary amount of pressure on her to re-
main in the relationship. Were she to reject him, her family
would be homeless, left without support, and placed at risk
of deportation. Taken together, these concerns suggest the
importance of evaluating the extent to which her current
relationship truly is consensual.
Complicating matters in this case is the issue of the
girl's immigration status. By notifying authorities of the
girl's relationship with her older partner, the physician may
be protecting her from exploitation and providing her with
an opportunity to get support and assistance in reclaiming
her autonomy. At the same time, however, such a report
will most certainly jeopardize the ability of the girl and her
family to stay in the United States. The fact that the girl's
two babies were born in this country does not give her the
right to stay in the country. Instead, she likely would be
deported, along with her mother, her siblings, and her mi-
nor children.94 In this light, one can see the unenviable di-
94. The issue of the children's citizenship, and, therefore, of their right to
stay in this county, or to return upon reaching the age of majority, is a hotly
contested one. The U.S. Constitution would seem to provide citizenship to every
person born in this country. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Nonetheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether this provision extends to the off-
spring of parents who are undocumented, and therefore illegally in this country.
For an analysis of the two diverging positions on this issue, compare Charles
Wood, Losing Control of America's Future: The Census, Birthright Citizenship,
and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J. L. & PuB. PoLy 465 (1999) (noting that Supreme
Court has never held that U.S.-born offspring of illegal aliens are indeed enti-
tled to citizenship, and arguing that such an interpretation of current law is
unwarranted) with Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the
Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54 (1997) (defending the Constitution's birth-
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lemma that the physician faced in considering whether to
pursue the issue of the legality of the girl's relationship.
These stories, in conjunction with the academic and
popular literature depicting the gray area that lies between
mutually desired, pleasurable sex and rape for adolescents,
help to make the case for statutory rape laws. This popula-
tion simply is too vulnerable to coercion and abuse to be ex-
pected to protect themselves from predatory sexual ad-
vances. But with approximately half of the population
under age sixteen engaging in sexual activity, the problem
of prioritizing cases for punishment is daunting. The fol-
lowing section will identify and explore three current
strategies for selecting cases.
II. CONTEMPORARY SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF
ENFORCING STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN A PROMISCUOUS ERA.
The problem with statutory rape law enforcement is not
that it is difficult to prove. Indeed, statutory rape laws are
fine examples of strict liability offenses. In most jurisdic-
tions, all that is needed to determine culpability is evidence
that the victim's age falls within the framework protected
under state law, and that sexual contact occurred. The de-
fendant's state of mind, including the extent to which he
believed his partner was older than she was, generally is ir-
relevant." Relatively speaking, these are easy crimes to
prove. What is difficult about statutory rape is selecting
which rapes, of the millions that take place every year,
merit prosecution.
Beginning in the 1990s, the criminal justice system
launched a "reinvigorated" attack on the crime of statutory
rape. Efforts to prosecute statutory rape cases have focused
on three general categories of these crimes: cases resulting
in pregnancy, cases that are easily identified, and cases
that involve conduct that is construed as prurient, preda-
tory or a violation of social norms. The following sub-
sections will discuss and critique each of these approaches
to statutory rape law.
place rule against calls for its amendment and against arguments in favor of a
parentage rule).
95. Phipps, supra note 2, at 126.
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A. Cases Involving Pregnancy.
Given that the resurgence of interest in statutory rape
primarily results from studies involving teen pregnancy, it
is unsurprising that pregnancy has become a primary focus
for case selection among law enforcement officials.96 The ef-
fort to prosecute statutory rape cases that result in a preg-
nancy may be observed at both the federal and the state
levels of government.
1. Federal Encouragement of Statutory Rape
Prosecutions. At first blush, the federal government's
inclusion of the following provision in its comprehensive
welfare reform act of 1996 seems rather curious: "States
and local jurisdictions should aggressively enforce statutory
rape laws."" What is a statutory rape provision doing
buried within a law that abolishes the former federal
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and
replaces it with block grants to states? But in conjunction
with the evidence that men over the age of twenty father a
significant percentage of babies born to teenage mothers,
this aspiration makes perfect sense. Men who father babies
with teenagers and then leave them tend to cost
governments money. Teenage mothers are
disproportionately more likely than other mothers to rely
upon public assistance, requiring both federal and state
revenues for support. 8  Thus, the government policy
favoring prosecution in such cases is predicated upon a
96. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the teen
pregnancy studies that have inspired the reinvigorated enforcement of statu-
tory rape laws.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 14016 (2000).
98. Note that majority of births in various studies are to teen girls who are
technically adults, ages eighteen to nineteen. Thus, statutory rape laws do not
even apply to them. Still there are 105,159 births every year to girls under the
age of seventeen, the vast majority of which result from illicit sexual inter-
course. And note that teen pregnancy isn't all that bad, and it's hard to miss the
underlying racism that fuels concern over teen pregnancy and unmarried moth-
ers as an issue. See Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminalization of Teenage Sex:
Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POLY
REV. 267 (1999); Deborah Jones Merritt, Ending Poverty by Cutting Teenaged
Births: Promise, Failure, and Paths to the Future, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 441 (1996);
Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., The
Fourteenth Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1933, 1956 (1992).
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belief that the threat of punishment will discourage these
men from having (unprotected) intercourse with teenage
girls.
Evidence of the federal government's position on statu-
tory rape enforcement may be seen in the Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families Act,99 which provides specific eligi-
bility criteria for states that wish to participate in this
program. Among these is a requirement that each recipient
state establish programs that study the link between statu-
tory rape and teen pregnancy.' 0 Although most states have
yet to develop comprehensive ,programs for reinvigorating
statutory rape enforcement,0 the federal government's
declaration of support for aggressive prosecution reveals a
belief that these issues are interconnected, and that some of
the problems caused by teen pregnancy would be amelio-
rated by the enforcement of statutory rape laws.
2. State Law Enforcement. Like the federal
government, state efforts to reinvigorate the enforcement of
statutory rape laws tend to reflect a preoccupation with
pregnancy. For states concerned with saving money
otherwise spent on public assistance, however, there is a
subtle conflict of interest inherent in the aggressive
prosecution of these crimes. To the extent that the state is
successful in securing convictions and prison terms against
men who have impregnated teenage girls, they severely
limit the capacity of these men to contribute financial
support to their children. Thus, recent practices often
reflect a selective targeting of cases for statutory rape
prosecutions, even among those cases resulting m
pregnancy. The threat of prosecution for statutory rape has
been used as a means of securing paternal child support, as
a means of encouraging marriage between pregnant teens
and their older partners, and also as part of a campaign to
discourage men from entering sexual relationships with
minors.
These various strategies for combating teen pregnancy
by the use of statutory rape laws are evident in California's
approach to this crime. Of all United States jurisdictions,
99. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1996).
100. JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CENTER FOR LAW AND SocIAL POLICY, STATE
TANF PLANS: OUT-OF-WEDLOCKAND STATUTORY RAPE PROVISIONS (1997).
101. Id.
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California has by far the most sophisticated and aggressive
mechanism for statutory rape law enforcement. Beginning
in December 1995, California has allocated $8.4 billion an-
nually to a project known as statutory rape vertical prose-
cution (SRVP). 02 Part of a larger vertical prosecution pro-
gram designed to assist states attorneys by permitting
them to retain the same cases from the initial filing of a
complaint all the way through the appeals process, SRVP
has increased convictions dramatically. Counties that, until
recently, saw approximately twenty-five statutory rape
prosecutions in an average year began reporting close to
200.03 In 1998, the most recent year for which statistics are
available, the $8.4 million budget yielded 5500 cases re-
ferred for prosecution, and a rate of six convictions per
day. 104
A close look at the profiles of those charged and con-
victed of statutory rape reveals a pattern to the enforce-
ment of these laws. California law bars sexual intercourse
by anyone with a minor who is under the age of eighteen.'
In spite of this, some California counties, such as San Di-
ego, only accept cases for prosecution when there is both a
large age difference between the parties and a pregnancy
has resulted. 6 Riverside County District Attorney Dennis
Stout says that most of his office's statutory rape cases in-
volve a pregnancy, because the SRVP Program grants "were
intended as a way to crack down on teen pregnancy."'0 7
Perhaps the most blatant example of the selective en-
forcement of statutory rape laws, and of a state's pursuit of
its fiscal self-interest in determining whom to prosecute, is
the former practice of Orange county social workers. During
1996-1997, the county social workers routinely advised
pregnant teenagers who had sought out their services that
102. See CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, STATUTORY
RAPE VERTICAL PROSECUTION: THIRD YEAR REPORT 1 (1999) [hereinafter OCJP
REPORT].
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id. at 3.
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West Supp. 2000).
106. Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape Laws Be Effective in Preventing
Adolescent Pregnancy?, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 30, 33 (1997) (noting that the San
Diego District Attorney's Office prosecutes only those cases "in which a preg-
nancy has occurred and the man is at least six years older than the underage
woman").
107. Tina Dirmann, Sex Crimes: Special Target, RIVERSIDE PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), July 3, 1997, at B1.
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the law required them to refer their male partners for
prosecution under statutory rape laws. °8 However, they ad-
vised the girls, this referral would not be made in the event
that the girls married the fathers of their babies. Once this
policy became public, embarrassed officials recanted their
position and this advice was suspended.0 9
Further evidence of the focus on teen pregnancy and
fiscal concerns in enforcing statutory rape laws is the Janu-
ary, 1998 law which precludes new mothers from receiving
public assistance for their infants until they identify their
baby's father."0 Ostensibly, this requirement permits the
state to seek contribution to child support, but in the cli-
mate of aggressive enforcement, it is obvious that these
names also provide an excellent resource to states attorneys
seeking potential statutory rape defendants."' Most cer-
tainly, it also deters a number of girls from seeking public
assistance altogether.
3. The Problem with Focusing on Pregnancy. There are
several problems with a focus on teen pregnancy as a
justification for enforcing statutory rape laws. Although an
unplanned, unwanted pregnancy clearly is one possible
harm that is inherent in sexual encounters with minors, the
tendency to emphasize this harm eclipses the many other
harms that are far more central to any legitimate
justification for contemporary statutory rape laws.
Statutory rape laws are predicated upon the belief that
certain individuals are so vulnerable to sexual exploitation
that they are incapable of consenting to sex. It is a crime to
procure sexual gratification from someone who is too young
to ascertain her own best interests in the sexual encounter,
108. See Kelly Connerton, Comment, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape
Exemption: The Victimization of Teens By Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 237, 240 (1997).
109. Interview with California district attorneys at the 3R's Conference in
Visalia, Cal. (May 3, 2000) (noting that several California district attorneys
from predominantly rural communities suggested that this practice still occurs,
particularly when dealing with Mexican-American perpetrators and victims).
110. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Reduced Teen Pregnancy Linked to Rape En-
forcement, WASH. TIMES, April 7, 2000, at A2.
111. Indeed, this is already happening in at least some counties. In some
California district attorneys' offices, for example, up to half of the statutory rape
docket comes from cases referred by the local family support division. Interview
with Rori Robinson, San Diego County District Attorney, at 3R conference in
Visalia, Cal. (May 3, 2000).
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and to make an informed and voluntary consent to sexual
activity. Statutory rape is criminal because, even though it
might look different from the classic model of stranger rape,
it is no less an appropriation of another's physical, moral
and psychic autonomy.
Enforcing statutory rape laws by focusing on the event
of pregnancy seems to imply that society is particularly
concerned about unprotected sex with minors. Provided that
one uses contraception, it seems there is no real problem
with such sexual contact. To be sure, the failure to use con-
traception, and particularly condoms, exposes teenagers to
many additional risks, such as pregnancy, sexually trans-
mitted diseases and even HIV. Yet the focus on pregnancy
ignores many of the ways in which sexual encounters with
minors that do not result in pregnancy may nonetheless be
harmful. Witness the exploitation, abuse and harm evident
in the research and cases discussed in Part I of this article,
none of which involved pregnancy.1
Finally, as a policy matter, the focus on pregnancy
makes little sense. A father who is incarcerated, and who
emerges from prison with a criminal record, is not likely to
be in a position to make a substantial financial contribution
to the child's support. Thus, neither the mother, nor the
baby, is necessarily benefited by harsh punishments for this
category of perpetrator. Therefore, the only justification for
targeting statutory rape cases resulting in pregnancy is to
deter other men from engaging in intercourse with young
women. This requires a heightened awareness of the risk of
pregnancy and subsequent prosecution among men. But the
chance of getting pregnant from any single sexual encoun-
ter is so small-25%--that it is unrealistic to expect men
who are not in fairly long-term relationships with young
girls to take seriously this risk."' In other words, there can-
not conceivably be a deterrent effect for those men who,
seeking only their own immediate sexual gratification, are
most predatory with respect to nalve and vulnerable young
women.
112. See supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
113. See generally EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION
DEADLOCic FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 52 (1996).
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B. Aggressive Enforcement in Easily-Identified Cases
An alternative solution to the problem of selecting
statutory rape cases for prosecution involves pursuing the
cases that are most easily identified. With over half of all
teenagers engaging in sexual activity, it should not be ter-
ribly difficult to identify cases for prosecution. Indeed, it
seems likely that a nightly sweep of the "parking" locales in
any given city, suburb or country town would yield ample
work for the local district attorneys office. This method of
selecting cases would be relatively neutral in terms of its
impact upon young people of varying race, ethnicity and so-
cio-economic class status. (Of course, it might dispropor-
tionately overlook the poorest youths, who presumably have
less access to cars).
Instead of this approach, states interested in identify-
ing cases of statutory rape have begun to focus on adoles-
cents' interactions with state agencies or health care pro-
viders. For example, sexually active adolescents often seek
reproductive health care for reasons that implicate sexual
activity, such as contraceptive needs or the treatment for
sexually transmitted diseases. If health care providers
could obtain the names and ages of their minor patients'
sexual partners, that information would constitute a rea-
sonable basis for launching a statutory rape investigation
against those identified. Additionally, one could identify po-
tential defendants by asking underage women who seek
public assistance to report the names and ages of their
partners. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the atmosphere of
"reinvigorated" enforcement of statutory rape laws, several
jurisdictions have attempted to employ these approaches to
generating new cases. Perhaps equally unsurprisingly,
these new cases tend to identify predominantly poor, mi-
nority girls and their partners, this population being dis-
proportionately likely to seek the assistance of state agen-
cies or government-sponsored health care.
1. Health Care Providers as Mandated Reporters. The
extent to which health care providers are obligated to
report adolescent sexual activity that violates the law is
highly ambiguous, at best. First of all, there is considerable
tension between health care providers' competing
obligations of patient confidentiality and their duties to
report criminal activity. Health care providers are bound by
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common law to hold confidential all information obtained in
the course of treating a patient.14 Nonetheless, state laws in
virtually every jurisdiction require health care providers to
report instances of suspected child abuse, and many
jurisdictions require health care providers to report
patients whom they suspect were involved in criminal
activities, whether as victims or as perpetrators."5 Thus, to
the extent that statutory rape is seen either as child abuse,
or as an instance of a criminal activity, a health care
provider may have a duty to report the case to a state
agency. Some states' laws explicitly include statutory rape
as a reportable offense for health care providers."' Others
explicitly exclude statutory rape." The majority of laws
offer no guidance on the matter. As a result, a health care
provider faces a Hobson's choice: making a report may open
her to liability for breach of confidentiality, yet failing to
report may subject her to state sanctions for violating a
statutory obligation."8
A second area of confusion for health care providers in-
volves determining which state entity is the appropriate re-
cipient of any report they decide to make. State child wel-
fare agencies might seem like natural choices, as they are
expert in handling problems of abuse or coercion in vulner-
able populations. But the reality is that these agencies are
114. See Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1974) (holding that the physi-
cian was liable for breach of confidentiality based on the theory of breach of im-
plied contract); Martin v. Baehler, No. CIV.A.91C-11-008, 1993 WL 258843
(Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that the physician was liable for breach of confi-
dentiality when physician's employee disclosed patient's pregnancy to her
grandmother, mother, and step-father); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d
801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that the psychiatrist was liable for breach of
confidentiality when he disclosed intimate details about his patient, discovered
in therapy sessions, to his patient's wife).
115. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-135 (West 1996) (physicians
must report to the police or sheriff gunshot wounds, powder bums, injury
caused by a knife); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-15 (West 1996) (physician must re-
port a patient with a communicable disease to the State Department of Health
within 12 hours); see also Illinois' Elder Abuse Demonstration Project Act, 320
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/3-4 (West 1993).
116. Patricia Donovan, Caught Between Teens and the Law: Family Plan-
ning Programs and Statutory Rape Reporting, 1 GuTmACHER REP. ON PUB.
POL Y 5, 5-6 (1998).
117. Id.
118. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the
Doctor's Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REv. 451, 463
(2000).
740 [Vol. 48
HeinOnline  -- 48 Buff. L. Rev. 740 2000
REGULATING CONSENSUAL SEX
over-burdened, if not overwhelmed, by issues involving the
abuse and neglect of small children. As such, the issue of
statutory rape may seem to them to fall outside of the
agency's purview."' This leaves the health care providers
with the option of calling the police. This alternative may
seem to punish not only the alleged perpetrator, but also
the victim, who is a patient who considers herself to have
had a confidential conversation with a health care provider
about a relationship she may perceive as consensual. Given
these options, one can readily understand why health care
providers might elect to ignore statutory rape laws when
treating adolescent patients.2°
2. State Agencies as Sources of New Cases. A more
subtle, but also more pervasive means by which states may
use teenage "victims" to generate a new docket of statutory
rape cases is through coordination with various state social
service agencies. This strategy may be observed at work in
the California SRVP program. In some districts, as many as
half of the statutory rape cases prosecuted every year were
originally referred to the district attorneys' offices by the
local family support division.'21 Recall that teen mothers
applying for public assistance are required to cooperate by
identifying their baby's father in order to qualify for such
assistance.'22
The strategy of using other state agencies as sources of
119. In order to explore this issue for myself, I spent the better part of a day
calling various Cook County agencies to inquire whether they had anyone on
staff with whom I could discuss statutory rape cases and reporting policies. Af-
ter failing to find anyone at the State Department of Children and Family
Services who even understood what sort of cases I was referring to, I finally
spoke with Debbie Palmer-Thomas, the head of the Help Unit at Cook County
Juvenile Court. This unit fields all reports of abused and neglected children,
and as such, would know about cases involving reports of juvenile victims of
sexual abuse or exploitation. Ms. Palmer-Thomas indicated that, in her decade
of work with the agency, the issue of statutory rape has arisen no more than a
handful of times, and that the agency has no particular protocol in place for in-
vestigating allegations of statutory rape. Telephone Interview with Debbie
Palmer-Thomas, Juvenile Court, Chicago, IM. (Aug. 25, 2000).
120. See ILLINOIS PLANNED PARENTHOOD COUNCIL, POLICY ON SEXUAL ABUSE
(1996) (embracing the notion that a strict obligation of confidentiality governs
interactions between patients and Planned Parenthood health care providers).
121. Interview with Rori Robinson, San Diego County District Attorney, at
3Rs conference in Visalia, Cal. (May 3, 2000).
122. See generally Cheryl Wetzstein, Reduced Teen Pregnancy Linked to
Rape Enforcement, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2000, at A2.
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statutory rape reports is not limited to welfare agencies.
Reports may come from state departments of social services
or child protective services, particularly as children prog-
ress from early childhood into adolescence.'
3. Problems with Focusing on the Readily-Identified
cases. The shortcomings of this approach to selecting cases
for prosecution are quite obvious. A policy that forces
adolescents who access health care or public services to
name their sexual partners raises the personal costs of
obtaining these critically important services for this
population. Because these minors do not necessarily see
themselves as victims, they may be entirely uncooperative
with those seeking to prosecute their partners. Moreover, to
the extent that these reports are filed by authority figures
that they trusted as confidential allies, a system of
mandated reporting threatens to rupture the preexisting
relationship.
Nor are the teenagers necessarily foolish for their reluc-
tance to cooperate with a statutory rape prosecution. In-
deed, from the victim's perspective, it is not always clear
that she is more protected by the filing of a report than by
the confidential attention of a service provider. This is so
because the vagaries of selecting cases for prosecution dic-
tates that many, if not most reports will not progress into
full-blown prosecutions. Nonetheless, the fact that a report
was made will set into motion a series of potentially nega-
tive consequences for the victim.
For example, consider the case of the pregnant fifteen-
year-old whose entire undocumented family was living with
her twenty-year-old boyfriend.Y Although the relationship
clearly violated Illinois law, it was not necessarily an at-
tractive case for prosecution. The young woman was not
likely to be a cooperative witness, as she reported "liking"
her partner, and she recognized her family's dependence
upon him for housing. Additionally, the fact that she al-
123. This may be true more in theory than in practice. In Illinois, for exam-
ple, such inter-agency cooperation is rare. Ms. Debbie Palmer-Thomas, who
runs the Help Unit at Juvenile Court, notes that she has made only one such
report in her seventeen years working with wards through the Illinois Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services. Telephone Interview with Deborah
Palmer-Thomas, Director of the Help Unit at Juvenile Court in Chicago, Ill.
(Aug. 25, 2000).
124. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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ready had two children might not have made her a par-
ticularly "attractive" victim for a jury, should the state have
elected to prosecute. However, it is quite possible that, had
her physician notified the police about the case, her family,
including her twelve- and eleven-year-old siblings, as well
as her two infants, would have become homeless, and all of
them could have faced deportation.2 ' Any opportunity to
help the girl, whether through attempting to provide her
access to social services, counseling, or simply necessary
health care, would have been lost.
12
As is the case with a focus on pregnancy, the attempt to
generate cases by forcing adolescents to reveal their part-
ners is unlikely to reach many of the most coercive in-
stances of statutory rape. From a public health and a public
policy perspective, this approach is quite pernicious. Ado-
lescents will not access services that they believe are not
confidential.' By placing a price on adolescents' access to
necessary public services, whether health care or child sup-
port, this policy has the effect of deterring teens from seek-
ing those services. And, as anyone who has even a passing
awareness of public health knows, it is the height of fool-
ishness to deter a teen from seeking contraception, treat-
ment for sexually transmitted diseases, prenatal care, or
food for their infant. Finally, this approach threatens to
have a particularly harsh impact upon poor and minority
girls, who are more likely to seek services from public agen-
cies and health care providers who work for those agencies.
C. The "That's Sick" Test: Cases Involving Significant Age
Disparity or Obvious Exploitation.
Perhaps the most common means of narrowing the po-
125. See generally Christine J. Hsieh, American Born Legal Permanent
Residents? A Constitutional Amendment Proposal, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511,
514-16 (1998).
126. A recent article by a young survivor of an abusive relationship with an
older man perfectly captures this dilemma. See Elvira Dzurlic, I Thought It Was
Love, FOSTER CARE YOUTH UNITED, May/June 2000, at 10-12; Elvira Dzurlic, I
Thought It Was Love, But the Courts Called It Abuse, FOSTER CARE YOUTH
UNITED, July/Aug 2000, at 36-37 (describing the way in which she experienced a
loss of control once she divulged to police the name of the man who had sexually
and physically abused her over the course of a two-and-one-half-year relation-
ship).
127. ELIZABETH M. OZER ET AL., NATIONAL ADOLESCENT HEALTH INFO. CTR.,
AMERICA'S ADOLESCENTS: ARE THEY HEALTHY? (1998).
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tential docket of statutory rape prosecutions involves fo-
cusing on the most obviously exploitative scenarios in which
statutory rape violations occur. These include incestuous or
quasi-incestuous encounters, relationships between young
people and those in a position of trust or authority, and
sexual activity between young people and significantly older
partners. I call this category of cases the "That's Sick" cate-
gory, as they seem relatively impervious to claims that the
relationship was consensual or loving.
Evidence of this practice emerges somewhat by default,
in that the presumption of age disparity or overreaching
seems to accompany many contemporary discussions re-
garding the importance of enforcing statutory rape laws.
For instance, in 1998, the American Bar Association's Cen-
ter on Children and the Law issued a widely heralded re-
port on the contemporary significance of statutory rape."'
Despite the fact that statutory rape laws usually outlaw
sexual contact with individuals under the age of consent,
regardless of the age difference or relation between the ac-
cused and the victim, this report did not even purport to
cover all cases that might be governed by statutory rape
laws. Instead, the ABA's report, entitled "Sexual Relation-
ships Between Adult Males and Young Teen Girls," ad-
dressed only a small portion of those cases.'29 By narrowing
their focus to relationships between girls ages ten to fifteen
and men age twenty and older, the report labels these rela-
tionships as abnormal, while granting tacit legitimacy to all
other illegal relationships with underage partners.
Current state practices support the implied message of
the ABA report that statutory rape laws are primarily use-
ful to protect teenage girls from relationships with older
men. This tendency may be observed both by specific exam-
ples from various states, and also by a survey of recent
statutory rape case law.
128. See SHARON G. ELSTEIN & NoY DAVIS, AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N CTR. ON
CHILDREN AND THE LAW, SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ADULT MALES AND
YOUNG TEEN GIRLs: EXPLORING THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSES 1-5 (1997).
129. See id. at vi. The limited research focus was based on advice obtained
at a one-and-one-half-day conclave attended by some thirty experts in the fields
of child sexual abuse, teenage pregnancy, law enforcement, prosecution, adoles-
cent health, and mental health. The discussion topics at the conclave consisted
of societal norms and mores, and the impact of child sexual abuse, race and
class, sexuality, gender, and media messages. Id.
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1. State Practice. Some states have been relatively
explicit about their decision to focus on statutory rape cases
involving broad age disparities. For instance, the focus on
cases involving age disparity is a standard part of
California's statutory rape vertical prosecution program.
Although California law bans sexual contact with any
person under age eighteen, the average age of those
charged with the crime is twenty to twenty-four, and the
average victim's age is fourteen to fifteen.
3 °
Another example of prioritizing cases involving age dis-
parity is seen in a recent Florida statute. In 1996, Florida
demonstrated its interest in targeting both older perpetra-
tors and teenage pregnancy by passing a statute making it
a felony for a perpetrator age twenty-one or older to im-
pregnate a girl under the age of sixteen. Here again, one
sees the influence of the "predator" studies on public policy.
The harm of pregnancy to a teenage girl is essentially the
same, regardless of her partner's age, yet the state primar-
ily is interested in punishing those men who are considera-
bly older than their teenage partners.
Finally, some states have mounted publicity campaigns
designed to discourage sexual relations between older per-
petrators and younger victims. For instance, beginning in
1996, Connecticut mounted a $250,000 advertising cam-
paign as part of its statewide effort to reinvigorate statu-
tory rape enforcement."2 Billboards, radio and television
advertisements portrayed men in prison, with slogans such
as, "Rob the cradle and get yourself a brand new crib."'33
The program ostensibly was designed as an effort "to re-
mind men that sex with a girl under sixteen is a crime and,
ultimately, to reduce the state's alarming teenage preg-
nancy rate."'34 Although praiseworthy in that it targets the
general population, rather than some (vulnerable) subset,
this program has not been terribly successful. Only one
prosecutor and one investigator were devoted to the state-
wide program. As a result, there were merely twenty-two
convictions in its first two years of operation. These cases
130. See OCJP FEPORT, supra note 102, at 4.
131. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04(l)(3) (West 2000).
132. See Matthew Daly, Statutory Rape Unit Ineffective, Critics Say Much-
Touted Program is Understaffed, Results in Few Convictions, HARTFORD
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included at least five in which the victim was a male, sev-
eral cases in which the victim was a girl under age ten who
was molested by an adult, and fewer than a dozen cases in-
volving teenage girls whose partners were over age
twenty.1
35
2. A Survey of Appellate Cases. One way to gain a
sense of which perpetrators are the targets of contemporary
statutory rape prosecutions is to examine recent case law.
To the extent that a disproportionate number of cases
involve gross age disparities or overreaching, one might
suspect that prosecutors are selectively enforcing the law.
Although it sounds rather straightforward, obtaining
this information actually is somewhat challenging. The
ideal way to ascertain selective enforcement would be to ob-
serve police investigators and states attorneys responses to
statutory rape reports, noting which cases they pursue, and
the basis for their decisions. Although such an undertaking
would provide the best information about statutory rape en-
forcement at the local level, it is so massive as to be beyond
the scope of this article.
Another more feasible method for observing statutory
rape law in practice is through appellate cases." A survey
of appellate cases only yields information about those statu-
tory rape cases that proceeded to trial and resulted in con-
victions, which were then appealed. Assuming that statu-
tory rape is similar to other criminal charges in that most
criminal defendants plead guilty to some lesser charge,
rather than face trial, this group of cases likely represents
only a small percentage of actual statutory rape cases.
135. Id.
136. In defense of this methodology, Professor Victoria Nourse notes:
One might argue that appellate cases will inevitably skew results be-
cause the facts are told from the prosecution's view when the claim on
appeal is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. That is only
one, however, of the many types of claims raised on appeal in my data
set. Other claims, based on evidentiary objections or the propriety of
particular wording of instructions, view the evidence from precisely the
opposite direction. There is no reason to believe that there is a single
set of biases reflected in the report of factual material.
See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provoca-
tion Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1351 n.112 (1997).
137. In 1997, only 12% of sexual abuse cases tried in U.S. District Courts
went to trial. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 422 (1998).
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These cases may be atypical in that the fact that they pro-
ceeded to trial and appeal, rather than pleading out, and
might indicate that there were relatively strong legal or fac-
tual issues in controversy. Bearing in mind these considera-
tions, the implications of which I will explore when I ana-
lyze the survey results, these cases may be read together to
reflect the general patterns of statutory rape prosecutions.
Working with the Westlaw database, I searched for all
cases between the dates of January 1, 1996, and March 31,
1996, in which defendants were charged with statutory
rape. Because some states no longer use the term "statutory
rape," I also searched one state database, Illinois, using the
terms "criminal sexual assault" and "criminal sexual abuse"
which were substituted for "statutory rape" when the state
reformed its rape laws in the early 1980s. I identified 272
cases in the national search, and 125 cases using Illinois
language and the Illinois database. I included only cases
that involved direct appeals relating to a conviction for
statutory rape. I excluded cases in which the victim was
underage, and the defendant was convicted of forcible rape,
rather than statutory rape.
After reading the cases, I classified them according to
one of four prevailing fact patterns. The four categories are
"overreaching," consensual relationships, acquaintance rape
scenarios, and forcible rape scenarios. Twenty-four cases
were excluded from my national survey and forty-nine from
my Illinois survey due to insufficient facts. For the most
part, these excluded cases read like the overreaching cases,
but did not specify the age of the Perpetrator, and so could
not be classified as overreaching."
138. Because I aim only to generate a broad-brush picture of modern statu-
tory rape law, I elected to search only one state using alternative language. Be-
cause I found no major differences between Illinois' results and those generated
under the general "statutory rape" search, I felt it unnecessary to attempt to
replicate the search using all of the modern permutations that denote "statu-
tory rape."
139. There were a handful of cases relating to statutory rape that I excluded
from this study because they did not involve direct appeals of cases involving
actual victims. They bear mention here, nonetheless, as they seem to be reflec-
tive of new trends relating to statutory rape law. For example, there were sev-
eral cases involving challenges regarding the applicability of state Sex Offender
Registration Acts to statutory rape convictions. See, e.g., Akella v. Mich. Dep't of
State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D. Mich. 1999). There were also several
cases involving "cybersex" police sting operations in which adults were con-
victed of having attempted to solicit sex with a minor over the internet. See,
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I then classified the case according to one of four fact
pattern categories. The categories are as follows: consen-
sual relationships, acquaintance rape, stranger rape, and
overreaching and/or age range of more than ten years. A fi-
nal category of cases were those in which the record con-
tained too few facts to permit classification.
The most striking finding to emerge from this survey is
the disproportionately high number of cases that involved
overreaching and/or relationships in which the perpetrator
was ten or more years older than the victim. Included in
this category were relationships that involved perpetrators
who were either in positions of authority and/or had a fa-
milial connection to the victim. Typical examples of these
include: stepfathers, mother's boyfriends, teachers and
coaches. The decade-long age span is sufficiently broad that
it represents the most serious crime in those jurisdictions
that classify the degree of severity of statutory rape crimes
according to the age gap between victim and perpetrator. I
set the ten-year age-span because I believed it to be suffi-
ciently broad that it dispelled claims that the relationship
was truly consensual. 4 ° Initially, I imagined that this age
range was absurdly broad, and that it therefore would gen-
erate a large category of "consensual" cases involving rela-
tionships between those who were less than ten years
apart. I was wrong. Indeed, the overreaching category rep-
resented a full 81% of the cases drawn from the national
sample, and 91% of the Illinois cases.
The rest of the cases were almost evenly divided among
the remaining categories. The next category, which I called
the "acquaintance rape" cases included 7% of the national
cases and 3% of Illinois cases. These cases involved victims
and perpetrators who were acquaintances, and sexual en-
counters that were reminiscent of acquaintance rape in that
the perpetrator generally claimed that the victim consented
to intercourse, while the victim claimed that she was forced
to submit. The frequency with which the "acquaintance
rape" scenario is prosecuted as statutory rape is unsur-
e.g., United States v. Burgess, 175 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 1999). Finally, there
were civil lawsuits addressing the issues of paternity and child support obliga-
tions for offspring borne as a result of statutory rape. See, e.g., Hamm v. Office
of Child Support Enforcement, 985 S.W.2d 742 (Ark. 1999).
140. Recall that the average age of consent is sixteen. Thus, these cases in-
volve girls fifteen and under, and partners who are ten years or more their
senior. See Phipps, supra note 2, at 61.
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prising. As was previously noted, prosecutors disfavor ac-
quaintance rage cases because they are considered to be dif-
ficult to win. " As a strict liability crime, statutory rape
provides an attractive alternative to a conventional rape
prosecution.
The next category was termed "forcible or stranger
rape." 4% of the national cases and 5% of the Illinois cases
involved facts that were consistent with forcible stranger
rape, in that the parties were not acquainted at all prior to
the sexual contact. Generally, these defendants were
charged with rape and other crimes, in addition to statutory
rape.
Finally, only 7% of the national cases and 1% of Illinois
cases were classified as "consensual," in that both the vic-
tim and the perpetrator claimed to have been engaged in a
consensual, romantic relationship, and the perpetrator was
within ten years of the victim's age. A variety of factors led
me to anticipate that this category would reflect the bulk of
statutory rape cases. First of all, this fact pattern is consis-
tent with the popular understanding of statutory rape-the
state intervening in a teenage romance. Second, I imagined
that the number of cases would be enhanced due to the
breadth of the age range I was using, in addition to the
overwhelming number of such relationships occurring at
any given time in a society in which half of all adolescents
are sexually active. Apparently, I was wrong on both
counts.
It is worth considering the extent to which a survey of
appellate cases may present a distorted picture of actual
statutory rape enforcement patterns. One might have hy-
pothesized that certain fact patterns, such as consensual
relationships, would be underrepresented in a sample of re-
ported cases. A purely consensual relationship would be
unlikely to be the subject of a complaint to police. Ms.
Alison Perona, a senior state's attorney and trial supervisor
in Chicago, notes that statutory rape complaints tend to
arise out of "consensual relationships" only in the event of
an unplanned pregnancy, a sexually transmitted disease,
physical violence, and/or parental intervention.'
Even if a "consensual" relationship is reported to crimi-
141. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
142. Interview with Alison Perona, Cook County Assistant State's Attorney
and Trial Supervisor, in Chicago, M. (Mar. 28, 2000).
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nal justice officials, there are many reasons why it may be
less likely to result in criminal action. First, there is an ap-
parent consensus among prosecutors against enforcement of
statutory rape laws in cases of "consensual sexual relation-
ships" among peers.'43 This is explicitly acknowledged by
some state criminal justice officials, and is plainly evi-
denced by the numerous enforcement strategies that focus
exclusively on older perpetrators. Additionally, prosecutors'
desire to obtain "big win" convictions-felonies, with incar-
ceration for the convicted felon-may also motivate them to
target older perpetrators.'4 Many states' statutory rape
statutes are graduated, in that the severity of the statutory
rape offense varies according to the age of the perpetrator,
or the age difference between the parties. For example, Illi-
nois law specifies that the maximum charge applicable to a
defendant under age eighteen who was involved in a "con-
sensual" sexual relationship is "criminal sexual abuse," a
misdemeanor. 145 Finally, these cases will be underrepre-
sented among a pool of reported statutory rape cases be-
cause the younger defendant, if charged, may be more likely
to plead to a lesser offense, rather than proceed to trial.
There may be years between the time when charges are
filed and a trial completed, and the paucity of disputed fac-
tual or legal issues, plus the time factor may induce these
defendants to plead guilty, or, if tried and convicted, to drop
their right to appeal. "6
Ms. Perona readily endorsed the implications of this
survey, noting that not only are cases involving overreach-
ing or gross age disparities more likely to be reported, but
also, they are much more likely to be prosecuted. As with
all statutory rape cases, provided that sexual contact can be
proved, there are few remaining disputed issues of fact or
law. Prosecutors like this category of cases, according to
Perona, because the defendants are not likely to be sympa-
thetic to judges or juries, and provided that the victim is co-
operative and believable, convictions are easily obtained.
143. See Oberman, supra note 19, at 16.
144. Interview by Ardyth Eisenberg, research assistant to author, with
Mitchell Kline, former Assistant State's Attorney and Current Staff Attorney
for State Industrial Commission, in Chicago, Ill. (July 7, 1999); see also Elstein
& Davis, supra note 128, at 25-29.
145. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/12-5 (West Supp. 2000).
146. Interview with Alison Perona, Cook County Assistant State's Attorney
and Trial Supervisor, in Chicago, Ill. (Mar. 28, 2000).
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These cases also are more likely to proceed to trial (and ap-
peal) because the defendants have so much at stake: their
jobs, their licenses, and their reputations often are on the
line.
In light of the foregoing, it seems fair to conclude that
statutory rape laws currently are enforced at the margins,
rather than in the main. The bulk of the statutory rape
docket consists of cases in which society is likely to view the
predator as "sick," rather than simply lovelorn, and cases
that arguably could be tried as forcible rape. "
3. The Problem with the "That's Sick" test. In contrast
to the other means of selecting statutory rape cases for
prosecution, the "that's sick" test presents few real
problems. By definition, these cases do not reflect "trivial"
infringements of the law, but rather, those involving serious
problems of overreaching and coercion. Thus, those
concerned that the criminal justice system is squandering
resources by attempting to regulate "puppy love" need not
fear. 148
All else being equal, the greater the age gap between
the parties to a sexual encounter, the greater the risk of a
significant power disparity between the parties. But this
enforcement pattern is not wholly unproblematic for those
who ostensibly fall under the law's protective arm. As is the
case with the focus on pregnancy, the tendency to target
cases involving overreaching or wide age ranges turns a
blind eye to the coercion and abuse that may infect sexual
encounters among peers. To illustrate, consider the fact
that none of the cases discussed in Part I of this article in-
volve age disparities of ten years. Remember that statutory
rape laws reflect a belief that, under a certain age, minors
are incapable of providing meaningful consent to sexual ac-
tivity, regardless of their partner's age. By reinterpreting
and narrowing the scope of crimes prosecuted under statu-
147. My informal discussions with states attorneys from California, Wiscon-
sin, Illinois and elsewhere affirm this conclusion. The law as presently enforced
tends to focus on what prosecutors, and perhaps judges and juries view as the
"truly inappropriate" cases.
148. For a vivid and passionate defense of the view that the over-regulation
of adolescent sexuality may harm minors, see JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO
MINORs: How SEXuAL PROTECTIONISM HURTS CHILDREN (Forthcoming, 2001)
(esp. ch. 4, titled "Crimes of Passion: Statutory Rape and the Denial of Female
Desire").
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tory rape laws, the executive branch has cheated girls out of
the protection ostensibly provided them by these statutes.
In so doing, the executive branch has undermined the in-
tentions of legislatures to treat girls differently from adult
women for purposes of consenting to sexual activity.
In more practical terms, the focus on extreme age dif-
ferences or overreaching assumes that problematic sexual
encounters can be identified by objective factors such as age
difference. This reflects an underlying assumption that, so
long as it was not forced, sex among peers causes no real
injury to victim. This latter assumption saddles statutory
rape law with all of the problems of prosecuting acquain-
tance rape. Prosecutors concerned with rationing scarce
criminal justice resources, as well as with securing convic-
tions, will bring their own perceptions of consensual sex
and/or their sense of a prospective juries' perceptions of
"harmful" sex, to bear in determining when and whether a
prosecution should take place. In order to vindicate the
wrong that was done to her, a victim (or her parents) must
persuade the prosecutor not simply that she experienced
sexual contact that is illegal under state law, but also that
the perpetrator was somehow "sick" or perverted.
D. Who is Left out of Contemporary Statutory Rape
Enforcement Patterns?
Read together, these three enforcement strategies leave
an entire realm of victims wholly unprotected. Omitted
from protection are those who do not get pregnant, and
those whose partners do not violate the objective criteria of
very broad age disparity or occupy a position of trust. To be
sure, some of those omitted from protection may be engaged
in mutually desired, pleasurable sexual relations. It is cer-
tain, however, that there are others who are being exploited
because they cannot or do not meaningfully consent to sex.
Harms from nonvoluntary sexual experiences can be
significant.' Research demonstrates that those who experi-
ence nonvoluntary intercourse are likely to have a higher
number of sexual partners as they move through adoles-
cence 50 Along with this come higher rates of sexually
transmitted diseases, higher pregnancy rates, and a higher
149. See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
150. Timms & Connors, supra note 82, at 19.
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likelihood of experiencing a subsequent nonvoluntary sex-
ual encounter.' In addition, those who experience nonvol-
untary intercourse often suffer from the harms generally
associated with victims of sexual abuse. These include a
diminished capacity for academic work, heightened vulner-
ability to males, impaired mental health status, heightened
alcohol abuse and suicidal ideation.'52 Most significantly,
there is no indication that these negative effects are associ-
ated exclusively or predominantly with young people who
had intercourse with older partners or who experienced a
pregnancy. Instead, the harms are an outgrowth of the
nonvoluntary or coercive nature of the sexual encounter.
In light of these harms, existing mechanisms for se-
lecting statutory rape cases for prosecution are flawed. As is
the case with all overly broad statutes, statutory rape laws
invite prosecutorial discretion. Ordinarily, this discretion is
exercised in a manner designed to effectuate, insofar as
possible, the statute's spirit or intent. If this is the case,
then the three enforcement strategies discussed reflect a
curious set of priorities motivating these cases. Contempo-
rary statutory rape enforcement priorities reveal concerns
about state welfare rolls and prurient sexual mores, but
lack a general appreciation of the harm at stake when un-
derage individuals are the targets of sexual advances. In-
deed, to the extent that states pursue the strategy of prose-
cuting the "easily identified cases," the enforcement of these
laws may be downright harmful to the protected population.
The following section responds to the dilemma of en-
forcing statutory rape laws in a promiscuous era by pro-
posing several practical solutions. These solutions have the
benefit of affording broad protection from sexual exploita-
tion to the entire population of underage persons, while si-
multaneously taking into account the difficulties these
cases often pose to law enforcement officials.
151. See Jacqueline L. Stock et al., Adolescent Pregnancy and Sexual Risk
Taking Among Sexually Abused Girls, 29 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 200-03,
227 (1997); see also M. Joycelyn Elders & Alexa E. Albert, Adolescent Pregnancy
and Sexual Abuse, 280 JAMA 648, 649 (1998).
152. Elders & Albert, supra note 151, at 649.
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III. REFORMULATING STATUTORY RAPE LAW FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY
As I have argued throughout this article, the problem
with overly broad statutory rape laws in an era in which a
large portion of teens are sexually active lies in establishing
meaningful enforcement guidelines. This requires a careful
identification of the purposes statutory rape laws are in-
tended to serve. As the following subsection demonstrates,
the purpose or purposes underlying these laws have evolved
over long centuries, from a mooring in patriarchal rights of
fathers to the complex set of interests reflected in contem-
porary enforcement patterns. As is evident from these en-
forcement patterns, there is no single, coherent justification
for statutory rape laws in contemporary society. And yet,
there is abundant need for them, as is witnessed through
their use in prosecuting cases of overreaching.'53
The following section therefore begins with a brief re-
view of the shifting purposes served by statutory rape laws.
I then undertake to articulate a contemporary rationale for
these laws, and finally, I proceed with a discussion of the
law reforms necessary to effectuate that rationale.
A. The Rationale for Enforcement
First codified into English law in 1275, statutory rape
criminalized sexual relations with females under the age of
twelve. 5 4 Although statutory rape laws may be viewed as
consonant with a set of laws that aims to protect minors
from exploitation,'55 at their inception they served an addi-
tional, and quite distinct function. These gender-specific
laws reflected an effort to protect a father's interest in his
daughter's chastity.'56 Under customary dowry practices, a
non-virgin was considered less marriageable, and therefore
less likely to bring financial reward to her father upon mar-
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Nancy S. Erickson & Mary Ann Lamanna, Sex-Bias Top-
ics in the Criminal Law Course: A Survey of Criminal Law Professors, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 189 (1990); Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of
Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. REV. 757, 762 n.35 (1980) (quoting the Stat-
ute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c.13, that "the King prohibiteth that none
do ravish, nor take away by force, any Maiden within Age").
155. Oberman, supra note 19, at 42-45.
156. Id. at 25; see also Eidson, supra note 154, at 760-61.
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riage. Indeed, if she failed to marry, a daughter represented
a lifelong financial burden to her father."' Toward that end,
statutory rape laws aimed to protect the father's property
interest in his daughter, and were an embodiment of the
historical legal perception of women and girls as "special
property in need of special protection."'58
Statutory rape laws remained largely unchanged over
the course of the centuries. By the time they were absorbed
into the American common law system, along with the rest
of English common law, the age of consent was set at ten.
The rationale underlying statutory rape laws shifted dra-
matically when late nineteenth and early twentieth century
feminists embraced them as part of their campaign to raise
the age of consent. In her rich social history of the temper-
ance movement, Professor Jane Larson chronicles the suc-
cess of these early feminists, who targeted the rampant
sexual abuse of young working class girls by men of higher
social class.59 Not only did these women successfully raise
the age of consent from an average of twelve to an average
of eighteen, but also, they helped strip statutory rape laws
of their fundamentally patriarchal soul.6 '
Professor Larson takes issue with those who have seen
the age of consent initiative as indicative of puritanical
sexual mores. Instead, her work demonstrates the powerful
feminist vision that guided reformers into claiming these
ostensibly patriarchal statutory rape laws for their own.
Specifically, she documents the manner in which the re-
formers reconceived statutory rape law as a mechanism to
protect naive young women from coercive and exploitative
sexual encounters:
IReformers asserted that the legal definitions of coercion and re-
sistance in the existing law of forcible rape were unrealistic and
harsh; that much so-called "consensual" sexual contact with young
157. From this perspective, statutory rape laws were an outgrowth of bibli-
cal precepts, by which virginity was so highly prized that the crime of rape was
punished by forcing the rapist to marry the victim. See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The
Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 465 (1995).
158. See James McCollum, Constitutional Law--Statutory Rape-Gender-
Based Classification Regarding Statutory Rape Law Is Not Violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 25 How. L.J 341, 355 (1982); see also Phipps, supra note 2, at 7.
159. See Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last": Rape Reform in
Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1997).
160. Id.
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women and girls took place within the family, or in dating, or ac-
quaintance relationships marked by violence, coercion, pressure,
or fraud; that employers and professionals often abused their eco-
nomic power or social authority to solicit sex.161
By the twentieth century, the patriarchal impulse un-
derlying statutory rape law was less obvious than it was in
the thirteenth century. Although the dowry system no
longer prevailed, there remained a deep concern with vir-
ginity, and also with out-of-wedlock pregnancy. Both of
these issues derive from the sense that women belong un-
der male control and supervision, and that once a woman
has experienced sexual contact with one man, she will be
less desirable to another.
For example, consider the patriarchal underpinnings of
justifying statutory rape laws by way of the "treasure" the-
ory of virginity, which grew out of Sigmund Freud's writ-
ings on monogamy and marriage. Freud wrote that "[t]he
demand that the girl [shall] bring with her into marriage
with one man no memory of sexual relations with another is
after all nothing but a logical consequence of the exclusive
right of possession over a woman which is the essence of
monogamy .. .."," Thus, according to at least one scholar
writing at mid-century, virginity was a woman's treasure,
and one who took it from her was therefore guilty of a
theft." Because the harm to the girl was irreparable the
appropriate remedy was prosecution for statutory rape.
16
The depiction of female sexuality as a perishable re-
source that should be preserved and then bartered away in
exchange for marriage is not inherent, as Freud concluded,
in monogamy. After all, many monogamous couples consist
of individuals who were sexually active with others prior to
marriage. Instead, it reflects a patriarchal belief system
161. Id. at 4; see also JUDITH R. WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN
SOCIETY 246 (1991) (discussing the "social purity" movement and Victorian
feminists' concern with protecting young females from sexual abuse).
162. 4 SIGMUND FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS 217 (1925).
163. See James A. Durham, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of
the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 76
(1952). See also Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation
of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 287, 311 (1997).
164. Note that this view of statutory rape law suggests that it operated in
conjunction with the civil laws governing seduction and breach of promise to
marry. These laws provided civil remedies to women who suffered harm in reli-
ance upon promises of marriage. See Larson, supra note 159, at 3.
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under which men acquire women through marriage, and
perceive a non-virgin wife as an undesirable acquisition.
This somewhat antiquated and perverse cost-benefit
approach to sexuality and statutory rape laws has little to
do with protecting the vulnerable from abuse. Given the ex-
tent to which these justifications, with their commodified
view of female virginity and sexuality, reeked of repressive
social norms, it is easy to understand why supporters of
women's rights might have felt unenthusiastic about statu-
tory rape laws. It is therefore unsurprising that, beginning
in the 1970s, second wave feminists began to voice the con-
cern that statutory rape laws perpetuated offensive gender
stereotypes and restricted the sexual autonomy of young
women." 5 It is critical to note, however, that these feminist
critiques reaffirmed the importance of the protective role
played by statutory rape laws. Rather than repudiating
statutory rape laws, they called for the abolition of gender-
based distinctions in these laws.'66 Even at the height of the
"sexual liberation" movement, feminists understood the
critical importance of statutory rape laws in protecting
young people from sexual coercion and exploitation.67 For
example, Professor Fran Olsen noted:
On the one hand, [statutory rape laws] protect females; like laws
against rape, incest, child molestation, and child marriage, statu-
tory rape laws are a statement of social disapproval of certain
forms of exploitation .... On the other hand, statutory rape laws
restrict the sexual activity of young women and reinforce the dou-
ble standard of sexual morality.
168
As is evident in this brief history, there is a tension be-
tween the protective and the patriarchal impulses under-
lying statutory rape law. Nonetheless, for more than a hun-
dred years now, statutory rape laws have been predicated
upon the premise that girls need and deserve the chance to
grow into women free from coercion and exploitation. Un-
fortunately, the law in practice has yet to take this obliga-
tion seriously, and girls remain largely unprotected from
nonvoluntary sexual interactions.
Several commentators and some state legislatures have
165. See Oberman, supra note 19, at 28-29.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 31-32.
168. Olsen, supra note 68, at 401-02.
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proposed reforms designed to remedy some of the problems
with contemporary statutory rape laws. These reforms may
be grouped into six general areas. The following subsection
will survey each of these proposed reforms.
B. Proposed Statutory Rape Reforms
Since the mid-1990s, a surprisingly rich new literature
discussing statutory rape laws has evolved.'69 This line of
articles and books acknowledges all of the fundamental
weaknesses in statutory rape laws, and sets about the task
of proposing reforms designed to make these laws more
compatible with contemporary sexual and social mores.
169. See, e.g., Anthony M. Amelio, Florida's Statutory Rape Law: A Shield
or a Weapon?: A Minor's Right of Privacy Under Florida Statutes § 794.05, 26
STETSON L. REv. 407 (1996); Baker, Once a Rapist?, supra note 31; Vicki J. Be-
jma, Protective Cruelty: State v. Yanez and Strict Liability as to Age in Statu-
tory Rape, 5 ROGER WmLLIAMS U.L. REV. 499 (2000); Lewis Bossing, Now Sixteen
Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaningful Consent, and the Implications
for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205 (1998); Connerton,
supra note 108; Meryl P. Diamond, Assessing the Constitutionality of Capital
Child Rape Statutes, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1159 (1999); Joshua Dressier, Where
We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on
Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 409 (1998); Susan Fleischinann, To-
ward a Fact-Based Analysis of Statutory Rape Under the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 425 (1998); Britton Guerrina, Mitigating
Punishment for Statutory Rape, 65 U. Cli. L. REV. 1251 (1998); Note, Feminists
Legal Analysis and Sexual Autonomy: Using Statutory Rape Laws as an Illus-
tration, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1999); Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminaliza-
tion of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10
STAN. L. & POLY REV. 267 (1999); Kitrosser, supra note 163; Michael John
James Kuzmich, Chapter 55: Tying Up Loose Ends In California's Statutory
Rape Law, 30 MCGEO RGE L. REV. 585 (1998); Larson, supra note 159;
LEVESQUE, supra note 48; Roger J.R. Levesque, Dating Violence, Adolescents,
and the Law, 4 VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 339 (1997); Nancy Morawetz, Under-
standing the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of
Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); Oliveri, supra note 9;
Bridgette M. Palmer, Death as a Proportionate Penalty for the Rape of a Child:
Considering One State's Current Law, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 843 (1999); Robert
L. Phillips, Peer Abuse in Public Schools: Should Schools Be Liable for Student
to Student Injuries Under Section 1983?, 1995 BYU L. REV. 237 (1995); Phipps,
supra note 2; Elizabeth J. Reed, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Re-
tarded Persons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799 (1997);
SCHULHOFER, supra note 28; Ken Tennen, Wake Up, Maggie: Gender-Neutral
Statutory Rape Laws, Third-Party Infant-Blood Extraction, and the Conclusive
Presumption of Legitimacy, 18 J. Juv. L. 1 (1997); Alan Wertheiner, Forum on
the Law of Rape: What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIm. L. REV.
557 (2000).
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This literature, in conjunction with the broader literature
on rape law reform, generally, yields at least six parameters
along which contemporary statutory rape laws might be re-
vised. These include abolition, reducing the age of consent,
permitting a mistake of fact defense, permitting consent as
an affirmative defense, establishing aggravating factors,
and narrowly tailoring enforcement and punishment pat-
terns. To date, the latter two categories reflect the most
widely accepted varieties of reform.
1. Abolishing statutory rape. Only a small fraction of
contemporary scholars advocate the abolition, or even a
significant narrowing of statutory rape laws. Some feminist
scholars have noted their discomfort with statutory rape
law's patriarchal roots, and the extent to which the
paternalistic nature of these laws impede girls from
exercising sexual autonomy. Nonetheless, because they
recognize girls' significant vulnerability to sexual
exploitation, none of the contemporary feminist
commentators would abolish statutory rape.70
Instead, calls for abolition come from those who are mo-
tivated by policy concerns relating to the impact that en-
forcing these laws has on the men who are targeted by the
criminal justice system."1 These commentators note that
statutory rape law is not enforced in a vacuum, and that a
conviction for statutory rape may lead to extraordinarily
harsh consequences. For example, in conjunction with state
laws providing life sentences for three-time offenders, oth-
erwise known as "three-strikes" laws, a statutory rape con-
170. Some commentators mistakenly read Professor Fran Olsen's original
work on statutory rape as calling for abolition. Although Olsen acknowledges
the law's paternalistic origins, she is quite clear about the need to retain some
form of legal regulation of adolescent sexuality. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note
163, at 287-88. More recently, Professor Olsen has reaffirmed her support of
statutory rape laws, jokingly arguing that the age of consent should be raised to
forty. Fran Olsen, Remarks at the 2000 DePaul University College of Law Law
Review Symposium (Mar. 11, 2000).
171. See Bossing, supra note 169 (objecting to statutory rape as a "crime of
violence" for purposes of federal sentence enhancement); Richard Delgado,
Statutory Rape Laws: Does it Make Sense to Enforce Them in an Increasingly
Permissive Society?, 82 A.B.A. J. 86, 87 (1996); see also Oliveri, supra note 9, at
506 ("Thus, I have a second, more extreme proposal for reforming the enforce-
ment of statutory rape laws: Eliminate them, at least in their current form and
as they apply to the majority of offenders.").
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viction may lead to a life sentence."2 Under federal immi-
gration laws demanding deportation of immigrants con-
victed of "violent crimes," a statutory rape conviction has
led to the deportation of a nineteen-year-old man.173 And
under most state laws requiring the registration of sex of-
fenders, one convicted of statutory rape may be perma-
nently labeled a "sex offender" and forced to register with
local police when he moves. 74
In addition to legal consequences, incarceration as a
punishment for statutory rape has some obvious and ar-
guably undesirable policy consequences. For example, when
the father of a baby born to an underage mother is incar-
cerated, he is no longer able to provide financial or emo-
tional support to his child or its mother. 5 By enforcing
statutory rape laws, society greatly impedes these men
from forming relationships with their children. This policy
is predicated upon the assumption that such men are unin-
terested, incapable or undeserving of relationships with
their children-an assumption that is unfounded.
Despite their concerns, it is interesting and important
to observe the relatively narrow extent to which these
statutory rape critics would limit these laws. Rather than
abolish them outright in all cases, these proposals advocate
a more judicious employment of these laws. For example,
Rigel Oliveri, in his article describing the harsh impact of
these laws have on those who father babies born to teen
mothers, unequivocally supports enforcing statutory rape
laws in cases involving the 'real crimes." 6 He perceives
these as involving abusive and exploitative relationships,
and objects to the use of pregnancy as a proxy for such rela-
tionships. Likewise, Lewis Bossing, whose article describes
the harsh consequences of terming statutory rape a "vio-
172. See Bossing, supra note 169, at 1212.
173. Xiong v. I.N.S, 173 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Bossing, supra
note 169; Morawetz, supra note 169, at 1958.
174. See Ryan A. Boland, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notifi-
cation: Protection, Not Punishment, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 183, 188-93 (1995).
175. The Family Resource Coalition of America reports that 56% of the male
inmates are parents, and find their relationship with their children important.
Also, the majority of inmates report being raised by parents in poverty, abuse,
and addiction. They fear that they will resort to destructive methods to cope
that will lead to recidivism. Therefore, these parents need assistance building
and preserving a strong relationship with their children while they are incar-
cerated.
176. See Oliveri, supra note 9.
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lent" crime, nonetheless accepts that it sometimes may be
violent. Thus, he proposes that, at least in the context of
three-strikes laws or deportation hearings, the underlying
facts of each statutory rape case should be examined in or-
der to discern the extent to which the interaction was truly
violent.'77
2. Lowering the Age of Consent. Although they vary
considerably, one can make the following generalizations
about contemporary statutory rape laws. First of all, the
vast majority of states have a two-tier system, reserving the
most serious offense for those who have sexual contact with
very young children. This category covers children up to a
maximum of age thirteen, which is employed in fourteen
states.' The remaining states set lower maximum ages. Of
the second tier offenses, all but two states set the age of
consent for penetration offenses at age sixteen or older.
(The age of consent is seventeen in six states, and eighteen
in twelve states.)'79
Perhaps the most obvious way to decrease the number
of statutory rape violations occurring each year is to lower
the age of consent, thereby reclassifying as permissible a
host of sexual encounters currently regarded as illicit. To
date, the only commentators to propose such a reform are
the drafters of the ALl's Model Penal Code, and they do so
with respect to those protected under the first-tier provi-
sions noted in the preceding paragraph. Section 213.1 of the
Model Penal Code defines rape as encompassing any male
who has sexual intercourse with a female who is less than
ten years old.80 Girls ages ten to fifteen are protected under
a more limited provision, which requires that the accused
be at least four years older than the victim, and that the
victim have no history of promiscuity.'
The official comments to this section justify limiting the
law's protection to girls aged nine and under by virtue of
the fact that 99% of girls in this age range are prepubes-
cent. The commentators assert that "Those who engage in
177. See Bossing, supra note 169, at 1216-30.
178. Phipps, supra note 2, at 131.
179. Id.
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980).
181. Id. at 334-38 (unlike the majority of state laws, the Model Penal Code
is gender-specific, and protects only girls); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 at
379, 384.
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intercourse with adolescents are neither as dangerous nor
as morally reprehensible as those who engage in such con-
duct with young children. In part this is true because the
post-pubescent child is a more plausible, though certainly
not an acceptable, target of sexual desire .... 182
The problems with this construction of statutory rape
are numerous. Not the least of these is the fact that this
standard focuses exclusively on policing male sexual desire,
rather than on the needs of the population to be protected.
The entire population of girls, pre- and post-pubescent is
reduced to sexual objects, and classified according to the
commentators' visions of appropriate sexual desirability.
There is no reason to believe that reaching puberty corre-
lates with a girl's ability to protect herself from a coercive
sexual encounter. This effort to limit the reach of statutory
rape laws accomplishes its goal without paying any heed to
unique vulnerabilities of the subject population. As a result,
it abandons a significant number of individuals who, lack-
ing the capacity to protect themselves, desperately need its
protection.
It is this latter point that may explain the general re-
luctance of commentators or policy-makers to adopt the
Model Penal Code's proposal. If one takes seriously the ob-
ligation to protect those who cannot protect themselves
from coerced sex, then it becomes clear that the minimum
ages presently set may in fact be too low, rather than too
high. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, in every other con-
text, the law recognizes minors vulnerability to exploita-
tion, and protects them from it by legal interventions.' A
thorough review of the social science literature regarding
minors' vulnerability to coercion and abuse in sexual en-
counters makes it readily apparent that minors remain
182. Id. at 379.
183. For example, in the health care setting, the law limits the extent to
which minors can consent to their own health care treatment. These limits are
drawn with an eye toward protecting minors' best interests, in that they permit
access to treatment deemed necessary, or treatments that protect them from
further harm, and yet, they limit access to virtually all "elective" health care
treatment. In the case of contract law, a concern that minors may strike unwise
deals has led the law to permit minors to engage in contracts, but also permits
them to avoid any contracts that they no longer wish to honor. See Oberman,
supra note 19, at 42-55. See generally Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and
Wrongs, 24 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 127 (1996) (for a more general discussion of the
legal limitations on minors' autonomy) [hereinafter Oberman, Minor Rights].
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vulnerable well into their teen years."8 Indeed, there is no
reason to believe that minors are any better at decision-
making in the sexual context than they are in the commer-
cial or the health care setting. Perhaps it is unsurprising
then, that most proposals for reforming statutory rape laws
are subtler than reducing the age of consent.
3. Eliminating Strict Liability. Somewhat related to
the notion of lowering the age of consent is the idea of
reforming statutory rape law either by adding a mens rea
component or by permitting a mistake of fact defense. At
common law, statutory rape was a strict liability offense.
One who had sexual contact with a member of a protected
class was liable, regardless of whether he knew the victim
was underage. Indeed, the defendant was liable even if the
victim led him to believe that she was old enough to
consent, and even if the defendant was reasonable in
believing that the victim was old enough.185
The majority of contemporary statutory rape laws re-
tain a strict liability construction; however, strict liability
laws generally are disfavored by criminal law theorists, who
criticize them for failing to distinguish between varying
levels of criminal intent.8" Thus, it is unsurprising that
there have been proposals to eliminate the strict liability
aspect of statutory rape. What is perhaps more surprising is
that there have been so few such proposals."1
The Model Penal Code proposes eliminating strict li-
ability as it applies to females over age nine but under age
sixteen.88 According to section 213.6(1), girls in this age
184. See generally Oberman, Minor Rights, supra note 184.
185. See State v. Stiffier, 788 P.2d 220 (Idaho 1990); see also Bruce R. Grace,
Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1395 (1986).
186. The Model Penal Code, for instance, suggests that "the imposition of
strict liability with respect to the critical element of the offense has excited the
ire of commentators and the attention of penal law reformers." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1, cmt. at 326.
187. See generally Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of
Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 819
n. 21 (1996) (discussing the defense of age as a strict liability element). See also
People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964). Contra Larry W. Myers, Rea-
sonable Mistake as to Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MICH L. REV.
105, 108 (1966).
188. Interestingly, the drafters intimate that they would have liked to abol-
ish strict liability altogether, but feared that its retention, in some modest form,
was "probably politically unavoidable." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 6.
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range are off limits to men who are four or more years their
seniors. However, men who engage in sexual activities with
these girls are exonerated to the extent that they can es-
tablish that they reasonably believed the girl was at least
sixteen. The Model Penal Code justifies this change along
the same lines of logic articulated with regard to lowering
the age of consent. It adopts the perspective of the reason-
able perpetrator, and notes that it is quite plausible that
some eleven-year-old girls might be mistaken for sixteen-
year-olds.'89 The implication of this observation is that those
twelve-year-old girls who look older must also be ready for
sex, and therefore undeserving of the law's protection.
Only one recent commentator agrees with this ap-
proach. Professor Stephen Schulhofer, in his book Un-
wanted Sex, proposes reforming the crime of sexual assault
to require the element of scienter. Indeed, Schulhofer would
go beyond the Model Penal Code, requiring the state to
demonstrate that the defendant knew the victim's age in all
statutory rape cases, including offenses involving very
young victims. 190 Schulhofer never offers an explanation for
189. [1It is at least conceivable that some girls under the age of twelve
might act and appear to be as old as sixteen. Assigning punishment for
rape to the male who has intercourse with such a child under the honest
and reasonable misimpression that she is significantly older marks too
great a departure from the general principle that the criminal law
should require a subjective basis for liability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt.6 at 329.
[A] girl of 15 may appear to be 18 or even older. A man who engages in
consensual intercourse in the reasonable belief that his partner has
reached her eighteenth birthday evidences no abnormality, no willing-
ness to take advantage of immaturity, no propensity to corruption of
minors. In short, he has demonstrated neither intent nor inclination to
violate any of the interests that the law of statutory rape seeks to pro-
tect. ... Whether he should be punished depends on a judgment about
continuing fornication as a criminal offense, but at least he should not
be subject to felony sanctions for statutory rape.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. at 413.
190. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 28, at 283. The Model Criminal Statute
for Sexual Offenses § 201 (b) states, in part, that "[an actor is guilty of sexual
assault, a felony of the second degree, if he commits an act of sexual penetration
with another person, when he knows that the victim is less than thirteen years
old." Section 202 defines sexual abuse as an act of sexual penetration by one
who knows he does not have the consent of the other person. Subsection (c) of
the proposed statute notes that those who are over twelve but under sixteen are
deemed unable to consent. Read in conjunction with the general provision, how-
ever, that only those who know their victims are under age will be found liable.
See SCHULOFER, supra note 28, at 283.
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his reformulation of statutory rape law as a crime requiring
a "knowing" state of mind.
The arguments against these proposals to eliminate
strict liability parallel those raised in the context of lower-
ing the age of consent. In permitting a mistake of fact de-
fense, one necessarily loses sight of those who are to be pro-
tected by these laws. If one believes the underage
population to be incapable of consenting to sexual contact,
then they should not lose that status, regardless of how old
they might look. Indeed, as one commentator observes, pro-
tests over the strict liability aspect of statutory rape are ac-
tually arguments about the appropriate age of consent, in
that under a certain age, no one would entertain a mistake
of fact defense. 9' Victims should never be subjected to the
process of objectification inevitable in evaluating a claim
that they looked older than their years. Instead, society
should establish an age framework restricting sexual access
to minors and it should be adhered to regardless of how
those protected by the statute might look or act. To the ex-
tent that the age of consent is determined by reference to
maturation and adolescents' general capacity to resist coer-
cion, the absence of a mistake defense should not be contro-
versial.
4. Consent as an Affirmative Defense. A considerably
more cautious, yet profoundly ambitious proposal to
reconstruct statutory rape law is to permit the "victim's"
consent to serve as an affirmative defense for those accused
of the crime. Ideally, this approach would honor girls'
autonomy, while simultaneously offering them the law's
protection.
Heidi Kitrosser offers the most eloquent defense of this
approach.9 ' Her proposal presupposes that rape laws
should be predicated upon nonconsent, rather than force. 9 '
As discussed above, the traditional force-based definition of
rape presents special difficulties for the alleged rape victim,
particularly when she knew her assailant, and was there-
fore less likely to have screamed for help.9
191. See generally Rhode, supra note 44, at 127.
192. See Kitrosser, supra note 163, at 330.
193. See id. at 328-29.
194. See supra notes 66-68 (discussing barriers to conviction in acquain-
tance rape cases).
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The nonconsent standard has been adopted in only fif-
teen jurisdictions to date.'95 It defines consent as "some
manifestation of cooperation in [the] act or [an] attitude
pursuant to an exercise of free will."'96 Several jurisdictions
have added the requirement that consent be manifested in
"words or actions indicating freely given agreement to en-
gage in sex."'97 In short, in order to prove a case of rape, the
state need show only that the victim did not manifest con-
sent to the alleged sexual contact. And with regard to un-
derage victims, the state need not even show that.
Kitrosser elaborates upon her proposal as follows:
Under a model statutory scheme... rape or sexual assault of any
minor below a given age could be proven without a force require-
ment and with the progressive definition of consent elaborated
upon above. In addition, states would enact age span provisions to
the effect that sexual activity between minors below a certain age
with parties above a certain age, or between parties with a certain
difference in age, constitutes rape or sexual assault. Defendants
would be provided, however, with an affirmative consent defense.
To successflully raise this defense a defendant would have to rebut
the presumption of nonconsent.99
What is perhaps most innovative about this proposal is
that it aims to honor girls' sexual autonomy by permitting
them to engage in consensual sexual relations. The consent-
based standard attempts to draw a bright line distinction
between sex and rape: in the absence of a clear manifesta-
tion of consent, it's rape. Unfortunately, in practice, this
line remains murky. Research from jurisdictions that have
adopted the nonconsent standard shows no significant dif-
ference in conviction rates. In acquaintance rape cases, ju-
ries remain overly cautious about convicting men of rape.
Instead, they readily accept any ambiguity in the victim's
actions, including her silence, as evidence that she "con-
sented" to sex.'99
195. See Kitrosser, supra note 163, at 295.
196. See id. at 329; CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West Supp. 1999); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-401(1.5) (West 1999).
197. See Kitrosser, supra note 163, at 329; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a)
(West 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.010(7) (West Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 1999).
198. Kifrosser, supra note 163, at 331.
199. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
barriers to conviction that result from these societal norms.
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One can easily imagine the consequences of this ap-
proach, were it to be permitted in cases involving young vic-
tims. Owing to factors with which we are well acquainted,
girls are less likely to take an active role in rejecting a sex-
ual advance. And if their silence may be taken as consent,
rather than honoring girls' autonomy, this "reform" would
enslave them to male sexual predilections. Consider for a
moment the girls depicted in the scenarios described in Part
I of this article: certainly, the defendants in the Nintendo,
the trampoline, and the football player cases all could argue
that their victims "consented" to the sexual contact that oc-
curred.
5. "Target" Defendants: Refining Statutory Rape Law's
Focus. The most commonly proposed statutory rape law
reform involves refining the law's focus to target certain
categories of defendants, specifically those identified by
what I have called the "That's Sick" test. 00  Both
commentators and criminal justice officials profess a
heightened concern about two sets of statutory rape
perpetrators: those who hold some position of authority over
their victims and those who are considerably older than
their victims.2"' The great virtue of these proposed reforms
is that there is widespread agreement about the
impropriety of such sexual relations. The proposed reforms
generally take one of two forms. First, statutory rape laws
could be rewritten to apply only to these categories of
relationships. Alternatively, the common law's blanket
prohibition on sexual contact could be retained, but with a
relatively mild threshold penalty. Encounters that fall into
either of the above categories, however, would be treated as
"aggravating factors," and those convicted would be
punished more harshly.
Many commentators agree that statutory rape laws are
particularly crucial in policing the sexual overreaching in-
volved in relationships between young people and those in
positions of authority. These may include relatives or pa-
rental figures, teachers, coaches, and others."2 These of-
200. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text; see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.3 (1980); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. 3 at 387; SCHULHOFER,
supra note 28, at 168-227.
202. Phipps, supra note 2, at 132 (noting the range among authority figures
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fenders are viewed as perpetrating an additional betrayal
beyond that of simply exploiting a young person for pur-
poses of sexual gratification. They have abused their posi-
tion of authority to manipulate the child into acceding to
their sexual demands. °3 Indeed, some commentators believe
that the risk of coercion is sufficiently powerful that the age
of consent for such relationships should be higher than the
general age of consent. The Model Penal Code would pe-
nalize any intercourse between a guardian and one who is
less than twenty-one, and Professor Stephen Schulhofer
would ban sexual relationships between a teacher or super-
visor and a student, provided that the student is under age
eighteen.2"4
A considerable number of state statutory rape laws tar-
get relationships between older defendants and younger
victims. Some states employ a simple adult/child distinc-
tion, penalizing sexual contact between anyone over age
eighteen and anyone under age sixteen."' These states give
tacit consent to sexual relations among peers, or even
among those whose ages are not particularly close, but who
are under age eighteen. (For example, a relationship be-
tween a seventeen-year-old high school senior and a twelve-
targeted by statutes, with some states specifying only parental figures, while
others extend the law to govern caretakers, teachers, and youth leaders).
203. See id. at 131 (noting the Model Penal Code's justification-not sepa-
rate offense but aggravated illicit intercourse achieved by misuse of position of
authority).
204. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 28, at 196; MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.3
(1)(b).
205. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.436 (Michie
1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-106 (Michie Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
403 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 773 (Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (1999); HAw. REV. STAT. §
707-730 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. §
709.4 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3504 (1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17A, § 254 (West Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN. 27, § 464B (1996); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 23 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d
(West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. § 609.344 (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-503 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.364
and 200.368 (Michie 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(II) (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7A (1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1111 (West Supp. 2000); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3122.1, 3125 (West Supp. 2000);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 22-22-1 (Michie Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
3252 (1998); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.079 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-5
(Michie Supp. 2000).
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year-old sixth-grader might be permissible under this law.)
Others build more complex matrices, in which identical
conduct may be subjected to distinct criminal sanctions. For
example, Illinois bans all sexual contact with those under
age seventeen." 6 If the perpetrator is within four years of
the victim's age, however this crime will be a misdemeanor,
as opposed to a felony. O7 The Model Penal Code would
abolish statutory rape except in cases in which the victim is
between the ages of ten and fifteen, and the perpetrator is
at least four years older than the victim."8
These statutes reflect a belief that, the greater the age
span, the less likely a young person is to be able to freely
consent to a sexual relationship.2 9 This issue is discussed in
the official comments to the Model Penal Code, which justi-
fies the four-year age span by reference to the risk for ex-
ploitation:
It will be rare that the comparably aged actor who obtains the con-
sent of an underage person to sexual conduct ... will be an experi-
enced exploiter of immaturity. The more likely case is that both
parties will be willing participants and that the assignment of cul-
pability only to one will be perceived as unfair.
21 0
This comment is more conjecture than it is fact, as the
commentators offer no support for their assertion. Do they
mean that it is rare for peers to exploit one another? If so,
they are plainly wrong. There is a shocking level of violence,
coercion, and harassment among students, much of which
has been highlighted by recent litigation and research en-
deavors.21' Perhaps they mean that it is rare for criminaljustice officials to learn of purely consensual cases. In that
206. 720 ILL. Coup. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16 (West 2000); accord LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:80 (West Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.034 (1999); TEx. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
207. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16 (West 2000).
208. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.3(1)(a), 213.1(1)(d).
209. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342-345 (Supp. 1997) (specifying that large
age differences creates a presumption of coercion even among minors).
210. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. 2 at 385-86. Indeed, the commentators
note that they actually preferred a five-year differential, but chose the four-year
figure to "reflect the prevailing pattern of secondary education." Id.
211. Commentators note that 85% of girls report being sexually harassed by
peers at school. See Jeffrey A. Thaler, Sexual Harassment at School: A Legal
Primer, 33 TRIAL 62 (1997); Deborah L. Rhode, Sex in Schools: Who's Minding
the Adults?, 35 TRIAL 64, 68 (1999); Julie Gannon Shoop, Beyond Horseplay:
Students Sue Schools Over Sexual Harassment, 30 TRIAL 12 (1994).
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case, it seems all the more important to permit the law to
accommodate those cases in which peers actually do behave
in a sexually exploitative manner. It also is not clear to
whom they are referring in their expressed concern that en-
forcing statutory rape laws among peers "will be perceived
as unfair." If one imagines the prosecution of one member of
a consensual relationship between two fifteen-year-olds, it
is possible, though by no means certain, that both the lovers
and society at large will see it as unfair. 12 But recall that,
absent a complaining party, or an adult's intervention,
cases like this seldom are reported to criminal justice
authorities. If one recalls instead the horrifically exploita-
tive "consensual" sexual encounters between peers, such as
those that occurred in Grosse Pointe, Michigan, one might
reach a different conclusion.21 As anyone who reflects mo-
mentarily upon their own adolescence should readily recall,
peers may be differently situated with respect to their ca-
pacity to exploit others. To the extent that statutory rape
law is designed to protect the vulnerable from exploitation,
it is not at all clear why exploitation by peers is any less
problematic than exploitation by adults.
Seen from this vantage point, the age-span statutes
represent a convenient proxy for coercion in relationships.
It is much more efficient to police against relationships that
violate a given age-span than it is to inquire into the qual-
ity of consent given by the individual participants in a sex-
ual relationship. And yet, if we take a closer look at the re-
lationships involving couples who are separated by large
age spans, we find that they are not all equally problematic.
Indeed, some are specifically sought out by the young girl,
who desires an older partner for reasons ranging from the
sense of security and stability he is able to provide, to the
expectation that he will make a better lover.14 As others
have observed, these girls merely are following the societal
script of idealized romance, in which a younger, more vul-
nerable woman relies upon a sophisticated, powerful man to
protect her."5
211. There was considerable national controversy occasioned by the statu-
tory rape conviction of Kevin Gilson, who, at age eighteen, had a long-term sex-
ual relationship with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend. Good Morning America
(ABC television broadcast, June 24, 1997) (transcript 97062403-jOl).
213. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
214. Phillips, supra note 16, at 17-22.
215. LEVMNE, supra note 148.
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There are those who work with girls involved in rela-
tionships with older men who indicate that, although they
are concerned about the potential for overreaching and
abuse in these relationships, these relationships often rep-
resent the most stable connection in the girls' lives.1 6 This
is not to say that these relationships are necessarily posi-
tive for these girls. These men may be no more likely to re-
main in long-term relationships with their younger part-
ners than are younger men. ' They may become more
controlling and possessive of their younger partners,
thereby limiting their life options.28 The girls report "letting
down their guard" more with older men, thus placing them-
selves at risk of pregnancy and sexually transmitted dis-
eases.9 But the girls themselves may have chosen these
relationships to meet specific needs.
Although a broad age span may serve to trigger legiti-
mate concerns about overreaching and exploitation, in the
end, the age gap is merely a proxy for measuring coercion.
It may be the best we can do in our effort to estimate the
risk of coercion in a sexual relationship involving a young
person, but in the end, it is only a proxy. Although the
chances of coercion or abuse may be higher in relationships
between much older men and younger girls, there is little
reason to believe that such relationships represent the ex-
clusive, or even the predominant setting in which such
harms occur.
6. Innovative Punishment Schemes. One explanation
for the resistance to enforcing statutory rape laws in the
context of sexual encounters among peers is that, even
though they might not always be purely consensual, both
parties are young and relatively inexperienced. Just as girls
216. See Kanin, supra note 76.
217. Phillips, supra note 16.
218. Id. at 34. For example, one of the participants in Phillip's study, Nora,
remembers feeling pressured into having sex at thirteen with her much older
boyfriend. While she did not feel ready for a sexual relationship, she did not
refuse him because of her fear of losing him. Other participants in the study
reported that men are attracted to younger girls because they want to "shape"
girls "so they will have someone to serve them." Sheryl stated that "because as
long as a man is giving, like how when I was sixteen... , girls that age, as long
as the older man is giving them money and buying them stuff and taking them
out, a girl will do whatever they say .... Id. at 36.
219. Id. at 36.
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are socialized to be eager, if coy, recipients of male sexual
attention, boys are socialized to pursue sexual opportunities
whenever they arise." Mistakes will happen. And it seems
unduly harsh to punish a teenage boy with the lifetime
stigma of a criminal record as a sex offender. To the extent
that cases involving peers ever come to the attention of
criminal justice authorities, officials might sympathize with
the alleged perpetrator. Perhaps they secretly recall their
own sexual histories with a sense of shame for mistakes
they made, or relief that they were not caught. Perhaps
they sympathize with the boys, who have been raised with
the norms inherent in the predatory construction of male
sexuality.22' Or perhaps they simply do not think the boys'
actions were all that wrong, or all that harmful.222 Although
none of the commentators addresses the issue of
punishment, concern about the consequences of enforcing
statutory rape laws surely constitutes one of the biggest
factors in determining how a statutory rape complaint will
be resolved. As such, it is a fruitful area for law reform.
To date, there is no comprehensive sentencing scheme
for the crime of statutory rape. Thus, there is a broad range
of penalties that may apply to the defendant convicted of
this crime. In Illinois, for example a "consensual" encounter
between a fourteen-year-old and nineteen-year-old might be
punished with a misdemeanor and probation, or with a fel-
ony and significant prison sentence.23 In the latter case, the
consequences for the nineteen-year-old may be far-reaching.
He may have to register as a sex offender, he will lose his
right to vote, his employment prospects will be impaired
and, if he is an immigrant, he may be forced to leave the
country. 224
Of course, positing the prosecution of a "consensual"
relationship between a nineteen-year-old and a fourteen-
year-old is a red herring. It is crucial to recall the fact sce-
narios that underlie the vast majority of statutory rape
cases. Chances are high that, if criminal charges have been
filed in such a case, the facts indicate some coercion or ex-
ploitation, rather than a purely "consensual" relationship.
220. See Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 31, at 679-84.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-15 (West Supp. 2000).
224. Boland, supra note 174, at 189-92; Xiong v. I.N.S., 173 F.3d 601, 607
(7th Cir. 1999).
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Even the pregnancy and "easily identified" cases targeted
by current statutory rape enforcement schemes predomi-
nantly involve defendants who are significantly older than
their victims. And yet, even if one believes that the harm to
victims in cases of nonvoluntary sex is grave, it is easy to
understand the impulse toward lenience among criminal
justice officials. In a society that glorifies young girls as le-
gitimate objects of sexual desire, is the defendant truly to
blame for his actions? More to the point, what is the precise
goal of punishment in such a case? If he is sent to prison, is
there any reason to believe that he will return to society
better able to respect women's sexual autonomy?225 And
what will happen to the "victim" in this case? Will she re-
ceive the support she needs to come to terms with this
prosecution, regardless of whether she intends to cooperate
with the state? How long will it take for this case to come to
closure? What is the impact upon her of a delay of perhaps
two years before closure is reached?226
One jurisdiction presently is attempting to craft some
answers to these sorts of questions. In a remarkably inno-
vative program funded by a state grant, Ms. Sandra
Nowack, the Dane County State's Attorney in Madison,
Wisconsin, has undertaken to resolve statutory rape cases
in a collaborative manner. Until the start of her program,
Dane County, like many others, tended to divide its statu-
tory rape docket into more and less serious cases. There
were two main categories of cases: those involving serious
overreaching and/or abuse, and those involving sexual rela-
tions between underage victims and relatively young perpe-
trators.7 Her office generally prosecuted the former, but of-
ten left those investigated for the latter with a mere
warning not to repeat their offense.
Beginning in 1999, Ms. Nowack's office attempted to
confront policy issues and provide clear direction to the
community and investigative personnel. During the first
part of the pilot project, Nowack and her investigative
225. For a painfully vivid study of sexual abuse and aggression in prison,
see JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: OUR DEADLY EPIDEIC AND ITS CAUSES 29-44
(1996). Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that a stay in the sexually violent cli-
mate that typifies our nation's prisons will work to enhance a man's capacity to
honor women's autonomy.
226. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
227. Interview with Sandy Nowack, Dane County States Attorney, in Madi-
son, Wis. (Sept. 20, 2000).
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partner, Ray Maida, focused their energies on exploring the
community's values pertaining to statutory rape cases. The
team hosted neighborhood discussions and invited comment
from diverse cultural groups. Almost immediately it became
clear that the Dane County community wanted young of-
fenders to be held accountable for illegal sexual behaviors,
but citizens were not satisfied with dispositional options.
Members of a cross-cultural and cross-discipline community
advisory group told prosecutors that dispositions for first-
time young offenders should feature education and preven-
tion rather than mere punishment. Community members
were concerned that young statutory rape offenders were
being lumped together with predatory rapists and child
molesters.
The Dane County project ultimately developed an al-
ternative disposition program for younger offenders, whose
crimes previously would have been ignored.2 8 Under this
program, those convicted of statutory rape offenses are
given the option of attending a nine-week class in sex edu-
cation. If they complete the course, their conviction will not
become a part of their criminal record. The course is taught
by a variety of individuals from Dane County public agen-
cies-health care providers, criminal justice officials, victim
advocates, and health educators. It covers topics ranging
from sexual physiology to child development to power and
control in healthy relationships. Although it is too soon to
measure the program's success in terms of preventing re-
peat offenses, the student evaluations to date have been ex-
tremely positive. This approach reflects a balance between
the law's capacity to set an exceedingly harsh punishment
for this crime, and the law's obligation to take seriously the
harm that it is designed to remedy.
A second aspect of the Dane County program is even
more innovative. Cases involving statutory rape are as-
signed to a special grant unit and are investigated using a
strictly multidisciplinary model. Grant moneys equipped
the team to focus solely on statutory rape offenses and to
involve prosecutors early in the investigation stage. Team
228. The project was designed generally for offenders up to age twenty-one,
where the age differences with the victim is less than five years. To be eligible,
the offenders must have no other sexual assaults on their record and must ad-
mit the sexual contact. Offenders who used any type of threat or physical force
are not appropriate for the program.
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members are then in a position to establish relationships
with the teens in a way which assures that the victims are
heard. Prosecutorial decisions are then made on a case-by-
case basis. Those charged with decision-making consider
factors such as the impact of prosecution upon the victim,
and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the perpetrator. The
program emphasizes that services of a sexual assault advo-
cate are to be consulted almost immediately. The individu-
alized nature of this approach is likely to allay the concerns
of those who see the standard punishment as too harsh a
response to the crime of statutory rape. 9
C. Statutory Rape Laws as Insurance for a Safe Passage: A
Proposal for Law Reform
Although certain of the proposed reforms might make
statutory rape law a more timely and efficient mechanism
for identifying oppressive sexual interactions, none of these
reforms offers a comprehensive approach toward accommo-
dating the unique vulnerability of young people to sexual
coercion. As a result, all of these proposals fall somewhat
short of the promise that I believe underlies statutory rape
laws: that girls (and boys) must be permitted to explore
their incipient sexuality in an environment that is free from
coercion, exploitation, and nonvoluntary sexual encounters.
In the following pages, I propose a series of law reforms
predicated upon this understanding of the crime of statu-
tory rape.
1. Punishment. The fear that incarceration is too
harsh a punishment for the crime of statutory rape,
particularly for young offenders, inhibits the criminal
justice system and society at large from identifying and
condemning problematic sexual encounters. This is a
terrible result, as it serves to permit, and thus to
perpetuate coercive and exploitative sexual practices. In
order to succeed, any comprehensive reform of statutory
rape law must take into consideration this fear of overly
harsh punishment. If not, the law will most assuredly be
229. See generally Oliveri, supra note 9, at 506-08 (suggesting that current
statutory rape paradigm is too harsh and proposing a new system based on col-
laborative investigation and charging, along with punishment for those con-
victed of statutory rape).
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underenforced. Thus, I begin my reform by urging criminaljustice officials to employ the broad range of options
available under the law in crafting punishments for those
guilty of statutory rape. Rather than focusing exclusively on
punishing offenders through incarceration, prosecutors and
judges should utilize a broader and more creative range of
sentences. Psychological evaluation of the defendant is
critically important, in that one might advocate very
different punishments for an individual who is a predatory
sex offender, as opposed to one who is attracted to a
particular underage teen. ° Less serious first-time offenders
should be offered a chance, under the conditions specified
below, for a suspended sentence, contingent upon their
completion of a rehabilitative program. This might include
counseling, or perhaps a class such as that used by the
Dane County program."'
The appeal of this approach to punishing statutory rape
is that it is predicated upon a realistic understanding of
adolescent sexuality. In an environment saturated with
messages encouraging the sexual objectification of young
women, it is easy to understand why boys and men might
pursue their own sexual gratification at the expense of their
partner. Because sex for adolescents is somewhat experi-
mental in nature, it is important to acknowledge that mis-
takes will occur.
Let me be clear about what I mean by "mistakes." Most
of the scenarios I described in illustrating the problem of
nonvoluntary sex were not mistakes at all. 32 Instead, they
reflect the calculated, deliberate appropriation of sex from a
vulnerable partner. The only scenario that is even plausibly
a mistake is the case involving the high school football
player. In that case, the relative youth and inexperience of
the boy, coupled with the culture of athlete-worship, may
have led him to mistake the victim's silence as consent.
230. See SHARON G. ELSTEIN & BARBARA E. SMITH, VICTIM-ORIENTED
MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES TO STATUTORY RAPE: TRAINING GUIDE 31 (2000)
[hereinafter ELSTEIN & SMITH] (noting that the conditions and length of proba-
tion or prison might vary, and that counseling options might include sex of-
fender treatment, batterer treatment, parenting classes, mental health coun-
seling, etc.).
231. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text for a description of the
Dane County, Wisconsin, class for those convicted of statutory rape.
232. See supra notes 54, 57, 64, 73, 92, and accompanying text (describing
five different cases involving nonvoluntary sexual encounters).
776 [Vol. 48
HeinOnline  -- 48 Buff. L. Rev. 776 2000
REGULATING CONSENSUAL SEX
Without having direct knowledge of the interaction between
these teens, it is difficult to assess the extent to which his
conduct was predatory, as opposed to negligent. Nonethe-
less, his conduct was in no way "innocent" or acceptable,
and to treat it as such is morally and legally wrong. Indeed,
one of the most powerful reasons for enforcing statutory
rape laws is to set normative parameters around sex so that
both girls and boys will learn to honor their own and others'
sexual autonomy. To the extent that society tolerates the
actions of the football player, and all those who appropriate
sex from another without consent, society sends a message
that this behavior is sex, not rape. And girls will be taught
the painful lesson identified by Catherine MacKinnon: in a
rape culture, it may be impossible to distinguish sex from
rape.23
Thus, to the extent that the law ignores the learning
curve at work in adolescent sexual encounters, it may be too
harsh. But the failure to condemn "mistakes" involving
nonvoluntary sex with an underage partner is equally per-
nicious. Lenience in such cases only encourages girls to in-
ternalize a sexual script that fuses dominance and exploita-
tion with sexual gratification. As such, it vitiates the
promise and obligation of statutory rape laws: to make the
world safe for boys and girls who are coming of age. In-
stead, the goal must be to establish clear lines and certain
consequences for those who cross those lines. To this end, I
turn to statutory reform.
2. Statutory Reform. At present, the laws in virtually
all jurisdictions represent a two-tier approach to the crime
of statutory rape. The laws recognize a certain category of
very young minors to be completely incapable of consenting
to sexual contact, and they provide harsh penalties for
those who engage in sexual conduct with these minors. It is
the second-tier cases, those involving older adolescents,
which pose difficulties for the legal system. The challenge in
reforming statutory rape law lies in determining how to
protect adolescents as they move through their teenage
years, enabling them to explore and grow sexually, without
leaving them completely open to the harms of coercion,
exploitation and abuse. Of course, these harms occur not
233. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 171-83 (1989).
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only in adolescence, but also well into adulthood. There is a
rich literature discussing the ways in which women's
consent to sexuality is a product of a coercive
environment. 4 The fact that adult women do not enjoy full
sexual autonomy does not undercut the need for statutory
rape laws, though. Rather, it underscores the importance of
shaping laws that attempt to enshrine the values of safety
and autonomy for young people making the transition from
childhood to adulthood.
As discussed earlier, the most straightforward approach
to reforming statutory rape laws in a promiscuous society
involves reducing the age of consent, and thus decreasing
the number of sexual encounters subject to state scrutiny as
statutory rape violations. 5 Although age may serve as a
good proxy for the victim's capacity to avoid abusive sexual
encounters, it is only a proxy. Thus, almost any age selected
as a cut off point risks leaving a portion of the "over age"
adolescent population completely vulnerable to exploitative
sexual encounters, while at the same time burdening some
of the "under age" population with unnecessary "protection"
from desired sexual relationships.
I believe that a better approach to the dilemma lies in
enlisting the law as a tool to be used by adolescents them-
selves as they navigate their sexual development. This gen-
eral goal can be accomplished by retaining a relatively high
age of consent, while simultaneously enlisting victim coop-
eration in determining the course that a criminal action will
take. Specifically, I suggest that states set a minimum age
of consent to sexual contact at no lower than sixteen. Under
my scheme, the general rule would be that, for a first of-
fense, the victim would be permitted to determine whether
the perpetrator should receive an opportunity for a sus-
pended sentence. As suggested above, the suspended sen-
tence allows charges to be dismissed provided that the per-
petrator completes a specified course of action. This might
include mandatory counseling and/or a class. In the event
that the victim fails to decide, the prosecutor would decide
234. See Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult Issue for Feminists, in
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, 298-99 (Mary Becker et
al. eds., 1994); Evelina Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution,
in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 303-04; CARL S. TAYLOR, GIRLS, GANGS,
WOMEN AND DRUGS 84-85 (1993); Fine, supra note 6, at 35; Tolman, supra note
17, at 325-28; Males, supra note 7, at 543.
235. Phipps, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
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whether to offer a suspended sentence as opposed to con-
ventional conviction and punishment.
There would be a set of exceptions to this rule, however,
for a statutorily prescribed set of cases that I term "per se
violations." These per se violations would involve scenarios
that are so rife with the potential for coercion, or so offen-
sive to societal mores that prosecution should be encour-
aged even if the "victim" does not wish to cooperate. For ex-
ample, a state should include in this category cases
involving incest, abuse of authority, sexual encounters with
those who are so young as to be indisputably incapable of
consent, those who are repeat offenders, and cases involving
multiple-offenders.
One might argue that victims should be given even
more control over the prosecution of their sexual partners
and that no prosecution should move forward without their
assent. Indeed, as a practical matter, most prosecutions do
not move forward without a victim's cooperation.2"' It
strikes me that mandating victim cooperation would be
problematic for several reasons. First, law enforcement
authorities already assign statutory rape cases a much
lower priority than other types of sexual assault."3 This
general tendency to minimize the significance of this crime
will be reinforced by a victim's reluctance to participate in
the prosecution of her partner, in effect giving the state
permission to ignore the crime.
There are a host of reasons why victims might elect not
to cooperate with prosecutors in statutory rape cases. Vic-
tims may be resistant to the notion that they are, in fact,
victims. Thus, they may prefer to protect their lovers
rather than contributing in any way to their punishment.239
236. Interview with Sue Torrance, Deputy District Attorney, Alameda
County, at 3R Conference, in Visalia, Cal., (May 2000).
237. See ELsTEIN & SMITH, supra note 230, at 1.
238. Consider the story of Jessica Woehl, described in Judith Levine's essay
on statutory rape. At age thirteen, Jessica met her twenty-one-year-old lover,
Kier Fiore, in an online chat room. Within five days, Kier began courting her
with gifts and visiting her at her home. After her parents forbade her from
seeing him, Kier impersonated Jessica's father, enabling her to leave school so
that they could see one another during the day. Eventually, the couple devised
a plan to run away together, and Kier picked Jessica up at the school bus stop
and drove her over state lines. Months after Kier was arrested and convicted of
felonious sexual assault with a minor, Jessica remained devoted to him. She
remained so even after learning, through the media, of Kier's history of abusive,
controlling behavior against other women, including the mother of his five- and
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This not surprising, as there is considerable research dem-
onstrating that victims of childhood sexual abuse often-
times feel love and attachment toward their abusers.2 39
Nonetheless, as the Office of Victims of Crime recently con-
cluded, in its comprehensive study of victim-oriented re-
sponses to statutory rape, "statutory rape is against the
law; it is a crime that creates a victim who needs help....
As victim advocates, we must keep in mind that although
these victims often do not see themselves as victims they
need protection from illegal sexual relationship."" °
Ultimately, this approach represents a compromise
based upon the lessons learned and analogies drawn from
the prosecution of domestic violence. Historically and today,
many jurisdictions required the cooperation of victims in
order to prosecute the crime of domestic violence.24' This re-
quirement is a double-edged sword, in that it empowers the
victim with a sense of control, while at the same time cre-
ating a significant obstacle to obtaining convictions against
those who plainly have violated the law. Victims may feel
pressured to let their abuser go, or may worry that they will
be held accountable, and later harmed, should they decide
to move forward with prosecution. In recent decades, vari-
ous jurisdictions have attempted to reverse this problem by
way of mandatory, or "no drop" prosecution. This approach
has met with considerable success, reinforcing the serious-
ness of the crime of domestic violence for the abuser, the le-
gal system, the victim and society as a whole.24"
As has historically been true of domestic violence, soci-
ety tends to minimize the seriousness of the crime of statu-
tory rape. Because of their youth and their psychosocial
vulnerability, victims of statutory rape need at least as
much support as do the victims of domestic violence. Rape
victim advocates, counselors who specialize in assisting vic-
two-year-old children. In a letter to him, she wrote:
My heart tells me to forget about it. That was the past, it wasn't me, he
really loves me. Then my brain tells me... [hie did it once, he'll do it
again. Every minutes [sic) of my life, I get flash backs of our whole re-
lationship .... I want to be with you so bad. I love you.
LEVINE, supra note 148, at 10.
239. See MCEvoY & EmcKsoN, supra note 77, at 37.
240. ELSTEIN & SMITH, supra note 230, at iii.
241. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation
in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1996).
242. See id. at 1861-65.
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tims throughout the process of investigating and prosecut-
ing a sex crime, are critically important to victims of statu-
tory rape. Those with experience prosecuting statutory rape
testify to the importance of working with the victims:
Most prosecutors... reported that they discuss with the victim,
often together with the victim advocate, what the victim wants to
happen in the case. The prosecutor and advocate explain to the
victim that the ultimate decision about prosecuting the case rests
with the prosecutor. They tell the victim that if the adult threat-
ens the victim or tries to dissuade the victim from pressing
charges, the victim can honestly say it was the prosecutor's deci-
sion. It is hoped that this will protect the victim from harass-
ment ....
In addition to playing a role in determining the course
of the prosecution, the victim should be provided with an
opportunity to present a victim impact statement. Too of-
ten, it seems that those involved in these cases are unable
to appreciate the harms experienced by the victim. A victim
impact statement might give all parties to a criminal pro-
ceeding the opportunity to understand the gravity of these
crimes from the victim's perspective.'
The virtues of this approach are considerable. First and
foremost, by requiring the victim's cooperation in order to
proceed, this solution leaves room for sexual exploration
among adolescents, while not abandoning them entirely to
potentially exploitative interactions. Additionally, it avoids
the problems of misplaced focus on teen pregnancy as a
proxy for nonconsensual relationships. It also would allevi-
ate the pressure toward mandated reporting by health care
and social service providers, in that the young person would
be permitted to decide for herself whether the relationship
in which she was engaged was consensual. Finally, this ap-
proach to statutory rape law would restrict the category of
those perpetrators subjected to the harsh consequences of
conviction for a sex offense (such as three strikes, manda-
tory registering, etc.) to those whose partners also viewed
243. ELSTEIN & SMITH, supra note 230, at 26.
244. Note that laws allowing victim impact statements are already in place
in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(4) (2000) ("Crime
victims shall have the following rights: ... (4) The right to make a statement to
the court at sentencing."). See generally Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative and
Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 361 (1996) (discussing and cri-
tiquing of the use of victim impact statements in criminal sentencing).
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them as offenders.
In order to facilitate this reconfigured statutory rape
law's ability to empower those it seeks to protect, there are
several factors that must be incorporated into its enforce-
ment. First, there must be a victim-counseling component
added to the criminal investigative process, so that those
who are the subjects of these encounters are adequately
supported.145 Such counseling should include, but not neces-
sarily be limited to, assisting these young people in recog-
nizing exploitation and manipulation in sexual encounters,
as well as in understanding their rights to autonomy, pri-
vacy and dignity. Counselors should address issues of deci-
sion-making, in order to enable these young people to reach
the right decision for themselves regarding their desired
resolution of this particular case. And they should address
issues of sexual decision-making and mental health gener-
ally, offering additional resources to those who are in need
of them. In the event that these cases move forward, coun-
seling resources may be necessary over the course of the en-
tire case. This is due to the fact that, in some jurisdictions,
it may take as long as several years for a statutory rape
case to proceed to trial." As a result, the victims are forced
to relive the events of the encounter long after its occur-
rence.
Finally, it is imperative to recognize that one of the im-
pediments to prosecution under this proposed reform of
statutory rape law lies in the nature of adolescent develop-
ment itself. Immaturity and a lack of experience not only
render a girl vulnerable to coercion in a sexual encounter, it
may also render her more likely to term the encounter "con-
sensual." It may be years later before she recognizes as
problematic a sexual relationship that she had at age thir-
teen. Thus, in order to adequately account for adolescent
vulnerabilities, the law must accommodate delayed com-
plaints by lengthy statutes of limitations on these crimes,
and to the extent possible, by lifting informal prosecutorial
guidelines regarding stale complaints.
At present, many states already permit victims a rela-
245. In the most comprehensive report on prosecuting statutory rape to
date, Sharon G. Elstein and Barbara E. Smith devoted five pages to outlining
the specific types of support necessary for these victims. See ELSTEIN & SMITH,
supra note 230, at 26-31.
246. Interview with Alison Perona, Cook County Asst. State's Atty and Trial
Supervisor, in Chicago, IM. (March 28, 2000).
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tively long period of time in which to file a criminal report
for statutory rape. This is because in most states the stat-
ute of limitations does not toll until minors turn eighteen,
at which time they often will have a year or more to file
their complaint.247 Indeed, in Illinois, the law permits the
filing of complaints for felonies at any time within the ten-
year period after one turns eighteen."
The bigger obstacle to delayed prosecution in statutory
rape cases may be the problem of stale evidence. If a victim
waits several years before deciding to file a complaint for
statutory rape, chances are good that there will be no
physical evidence of the crime. Moreover, any witnesses
may be difficult to find, and their memories of the encoun-
ter or relationship may have dissipated. As a result, some
states have laws that serve to inhibit the prosecution of sex
crimes in the event of a "delayed outcry." 9 In addition to
statutory limitations, there are pragmatic ones. It is only
natural that prosecutors would be unenthusiastic about
undertaking a prosecution in which the only evidence is the
victim's word that the crime took place, particularly where
that "word" refers to an event that occurred, just say, five
years ago. Nonetheless, I believe that such cases may be
winnable. First of all, a full investigation may well yield
witnesses in whom the victim confided at the time of the
sexual encounter. Secondly, the victim may be a far more
credible witness as an older teen or even an adult than she
would have been as a younger girl.
Finally, even in the event that such cases are difficult
to win, I nonetheless support their prosecution. A person
who comes forward, even years later, with a complaint that
her sexual autonomy was violated when she was a child de-
serves the support of the law. Sexual interactions are, by
definition, serious undertakings. Anyone who engages in a
247. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6 (West 2000).
248. Indeed, in Illinois, the law permits the filing of complaints for felonies
at any time within the ten-year period after one turns eighteen. Id. The law re-
quires that the victim report the offense by age twenty-one, unless the accused
is a family member, in which case there is no need to report. In effect, this
means that one who is the victim of an abusive relationship with her neighbor
at age thirteen may wait until age twenty-one to make a report. The police will
have until the victim is twenty-eight to decide whether to press charges. Id.
249. For example, consider 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6(h) (West 1999). Until
it was amended in January, 2000, the law provided a five-year statute of limita-
tions on criminal sexual assault, but only for a complainant who reports the of-
fense within six months of its commission.
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sexual encounter with an underage person should under-
stand that he does so at the grave risk of miscommunica-
tion, injury and harm, and that the law will allow his part-
ner ample time in which to consider whether the encounter
was indeed consensual. If statutory rape laws are to facili-
tate and honor young people's rights to explore their incipi-
ent sexuality in an environment that is free from coercion,
exploitation and nonvoluntary sexual encounters, we must
honor those who come forward to complain about such en-
counters.
IV. CONCLUSION
We live in a society in which the majority of victims of
forcible rape are girls less than eighteen years of age.25° We
live in a society in which rape still goes largely unpunished
when it occurs between acquaintances. 5' We live in a soci-
ety permeated with imagery that glorifies male sexual ini-
tiative and sexuality, while objectifying adolescent beauty.
We live in a society in which the combination of adolescents
and sex seems inevitable, and inherently bound up with the
risk of exploitation and coercion. And yet, in spite of all of
this, we live in a society that has in place a legal solution
that promises some protection to young people as they come
of age sexually. Reconstituted and reinvigorated, statutory
rape laws can help to illuminate the path toward sexual
and personal autonomy.
250. According to the Department of Justice, rape is a widely underreported
offense. As such, it is difficult to approximate the number of girls who are raped
every year. The Department of Justice estimates the total number of rapes at
311,110. The number of rapes of girls between twelve and nineteen is estimated
at 124,620.
251. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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